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Dedication
This Capstone is dedicated to the memory of those who lost their lives aboard
American Airlines Flight 11,
American Airlines Flight 77,
United Airlines Flight 93,
United Airlines Flight 175,
and those inside the
Pentagon and World Trade Center Towers.
May their deaths not be the end, but a new beginning.

http://september11.archive.org

3

Table of Contents

Capstone……………………………………………………………….………5
Appendix I: (www.tolerance.org test results) …………………………28
Appendix II: (Do’s and Don’ts for Building Good Relationships) …….28
Appendix III: (Commitment to Combat Oppression) ….……….………30
Appendix IV: (World Investment Report 2001) ………………………..31
Appendix V: (Capstone Prospectus)………………………………..……63
Citation of Photographs……………………………………………………66
Works Cited………………………………………………………………….67

4

Imagine a sunny morning and you are just putting your clothes on and preparing
to head out the door to work. You hear a loud, low hum that seems to be getting louder,
or closer, you don’t know which because you have no idea what it could be. It gets
louder and louder and you begin to get nervous.

Suddenly there is a deafening

explosion and your house shakes like the ground is opening up. The lights flicker and
pictures fall from the walls and crash onto the floor. The roar is such a horrific sound
It never dawns
on you that
your country,
the most
powerful
country in the
world, has just
been attacked
by terrorists.

and seems to last forever. Your first instinct is to run to the interior
of the house for cover. Suddenly you hear screaming outside and
you run back to the window that looks out over the street and it’s
raining fire.

There is panic and you hear the sound of sirens.

People are running south down the street; some stand as if
paralyzed staring up to the north sky. Chunks of metal and blocks

of concrete drop from above onto the cars parked on the street; people are running for
cover; the dust is thickening and you can hardly see to make sure your car hasn’t
caught fire yet. You stand at your window not knowing what has happened or even
what to do. You wonder if it’s the “end of the world” that those religious folks down in
Times Square have been predicting. “What else could it be”, you wonder. It never
dawns on you that your country, the most powerful country in the world, has just been
attacked by terrorists – not just once; but by the end of the usual morning commute, the
greatest land on earth will have been attacked 4 times in all. It is unthinkable. And it
happened. To us.
Slowly, one by one, Americans began to wake up – some to the panicked voices
of their loved ones on the phone, “get up, go turn on the TV.” The horrific scene began
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to unfold before our very eyes. Almost no one made it into work on time that morning,
the morning of September 11, 2001.

People spent hours in front of the television

waiting for news of their safety. “Are there more attacks on the way?” “Are we safe to
leave our houses and families to go to work/school?”

Our security had just been

compromised; something almost everyone was sure could never happen. After all, this
was America, land of the free and home of the brave.

Naturally we felt a new

vulnerability – that is part of what terrorism aims to do. We felt fear, anger, sadness,
and an intense national pride – akin to siblings who fight daily but defend each other
tooth and nail when the bully down the street picks a fight.
It wasn’t long before theories and speculations as to who was responsible for the
attacks began to clutter up the airwaves. A new emotion began to seep its way into the
American psyche – paranoia. All we had were faces of Middle Eastern men and images
of the horror repeated hourly on network television. Our own prejudices and biases
began to work against us and in a time when we should have been pulling together as a
nation, we were leaving part of our population, those who claim a Middle-Eastern
heritage or Muslim religion, out in the cold.
It is understandable in a time of crisis to look for the threat so we can guard
ourselves against it. But the aftermath of 9-11, with the threat more and more elusive,
we began, in our desperation for control over our fears, to seek out those whose
identification and capture could provide an end to our anxiety – for all intents and
purposes, a scapegoat. The problem with this approach, besides the inherent racism
and injustice, is that once the actual culprits became known we realized that we had
damaged a certain aspect of our national community – the ability to trust and to coexist
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with those who are not like us, and their ability to trust and to coexist with us in return.
This particular consequence of our behavior in the aftermath of September 11th poses
significant issues for the business world, in which people of different backgrounds,
cultures, religions, and ethnicities need to work together cooperatively on a daily basis.
In this exploration of ethics and the global business community we will see how a
study of ethics in undergraduate courses at American universities can be an essential
basis for students’ successful entry and navigation of this global professionalism. We
will begin by understanding the atmosphere in which American graduates are entering
this workforce and how the globalization of economies has changed the way this
workforce operates. We will, then, explore the fundamentals of an introduction to ethics
and how that might be of importance in this realm, discuss why ethics is needed, and
how it might be broached in the educational arena. Finally we will explore the possible
outcomes and reasons how and why a study of ethics can aid our success in the global
economy.

The atmosphere of the global economy
No one can argue against the claim that the world is going the way of
cooperation as far as economies are concerned. We may have our national agendas in
the realms of policy and such but it is generally noticed that economies work well when
intertwined with each other.

We have international banks and international

corporations, based here in America as well as in many of the other major nations. The
diversity of our corporations is on the rise.

The Population Reference Bureau, a

corporation/website dedicated to making US Census information accessible to
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educators, policymakers, and citizens, has generated some projections about the
people entering the American workforce. Howard Fullerton Jr, a contributor to this site,
projects that from now until the year 2008, we can expect around 42 million people to
enter this job market.

Compared with the group of 112 million workers who will remain in the
labor force during this period (40 percent white male and 25 percent
minority), the group of new workers is more diverse (just 30 percent white
male but 41 percent minority). About one-fourth of the entrants are
expected to be Hispanic or Asian — two groups that make up one-seventh
of today's labor force. Women are expected to be 50 percent of the
entrants, compared with 47 percent of the "stayers." These projected
developments largely reflect the growth in racial and ethnic diversity in the
total U.S. population, as well as the younger age structure of minority
populations (Fullerton, qtd. in Population Reference Bureau).
It is not a new scene; it is an evolved one.

It has become known as Economic

Globalization and it poses real opportunities and real concerns for those who want to
participate in it.

Economic Globalization, as defined by urban sociologist Saskia

Sassen, is coming about through increased cooperation between countries throughout
the world to consolidate ideas in technology, automation, communication, finance, and
politics (8).
8

Sassen, a professor of Urban Planning at
Columbia University, claims that it is because of this
increase in transnational economic cooperation that
we are seeing a growth in major cities that become

San Francisco, California

home to those who keep these multinational corporations in business, from the CEOs to
the front-line customer service representatives.

This growth is opening most

corporations to an influx of immigrants, increasing their diversity. “For better or for
worse,” Sassen states, “the transnational corporation is now a strategic organizer of
what we call the world economy” (15).
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are not the only player in the diverse job
market but they are by far one of the biggest. They have the capital and the asset
structure to make advances and promote products that make them very lucrative and
attractive options for the professional woman or man graduating from university. The
most recent United Nations Conference of Trade and Development has ranked various
countries in terms of their asset structure in their World Investment Report for 2001.
They have divided the ranking into two categories, developed countries and developing
countries, for more equitable comparison.

Of the top 5 Transnational Corporations

(TNCs) in the world parented, or based, in developed countries, ranked by foreign
assets, four (4) are parented in the United States and one (1) is parented jointly in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom (See Appendix IV 6). The ratios of foreign to total
assets, sales, and employees show that a great portion of the financial and personnel
support for these corporations comes from foreign sources. When we also look at the
top 5 TNCs in the world parented by developing countries, as designated by the UN
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Conference, (Honk Kong, Venezuela, Mexico, Malaysia, and Korea) we can see that
although the actual numbers are significantly lower, the ratios are still comparably
similar (See Appendix IV 7). What this means for Americans is that although many
major companies may be based in this country it is a wide diversity of employees who
actually make up their foundational structure – and the same is seen throughout the
global economy. Diversification, the process by which corporations increase the variety
in their products and/or personnel, has become a strength propelling these corporations
to the top (“World Investment Report 2001” 11).
According to a recent report on legal immigration published by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service in the fiscal year 2000, America saw the influx of 849,807
legal immigrants (47.9% new arrivals, 52.1% adjustment of status), up from 646,568
(62.1% new arrivals, 37.9% adjustment of status) in 1999. The percentage of these
immigrants coming to the United States as professionals with advanced degrees has
almost doubled from 1.3% in 1999 to 2.4% in 2000. The highest percentages are
immigrating to California (25.6%) and New York (12.5%). The reality is that we are
increasingly diversifying our workplaces and it is becoming virtually impossible to hold a
job which doesn’t entail some form of interaction with those of different races,
ethnicities, religions, values, etc (“INS Report” 5).
Due to this increasingly multicultural job market and recent events involving
foreign nationals attacking the United States, today American college graduates are
more in need of interracial and intercultural skills in order to be successful, especially in
the workplace. As with any new exposure, we cannot be expected to intuitively know
how a person relates to his or her own identity (whatever may comprise that term for
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each person). What we can be expected to do is learn how to cope with variables of
human interaction in a way that neither imposes our own way of dealing with the world
nor negates another’s. This is a key factor in being able to execute critical problemsolving techniques that benefit all parties involved and is a skill highly sought-after by
corporations wishing to expand or maintain their international connections.

Fundamentals of Ethics
The current global economy is creating a job market that is as ethnically diverse
as it is technologically progressive. “New economic forces are
creating conditions in which the most productive organizations,
organizations with a competitive advantage, are those that welcome
the diversity among their workers… More and more, people with

Friction is
where
ethics
makes a
difference

differing value systems and backgrounds are interacting in dynamic
team situations, in organizational networks, and with an increasingly diverse customer
base.

As that interaction grows, so does diversity’s potential for creating friction”

(Carnevale, par. 3). Friction is where ethics makes a difference.
A comprehensive study of ethics can be crucial in gaining the skills necessary to
engage others on their own terms and to make effective strides towards solutions that
account for everyone’s best interest. “Societies are tragically vulnerable when the men
and women who compose them lack character. A nation or a culture cannot endure for
long unless it is undergirded [sic] by common values such as valor, public-spiritedness,
respect for others and for the law; it cannot stand unless it is populated by people who
will act on motives superior to their own immediate interest. Keeping the law, respecting
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human life and property, loving one’s family, fighting to defend national goals, helping
the unfortunate, paying taxes—all these depend on the individual virtues of courage,
loyalty, charity, compassion, civility, and duty” (Colson 67).

In the multicultural

workforce we, as American graduates, whether working at home or abroad, will be
called upon to be representatives of our nation. We must embody certain values and
ways of being, to be explained shortly, which can aid us in seeking successful
cooperation with others we may not necessarily understand. In as much as “keeping
the law” is a fundamental aspect of ethical behavior it should be noted that there are,
indeed, laws that are unethical in nature. This doesn’t mean that those laws still do not
have to be obeyed.

It doesn’t mean, however, that they cannot also be changed.

Breaking an unethical law is not the way to go about making things right but one can
absolutely challenge those laws, in the proper methods, that are deemed unfair or
unethical.
According to a Newsweek article published shortly after September 11, my
generation, America’s college-age population, “despite [our] perceived apathy and
political inexperience, might be uniquely qualified to understand the current [culture
clash].” The authors note how we are more likely than our parents “to have dated a
person from another culture or race, and to have friends from many economic and
ethnic backgrounds.” We have some unique experiences that can and will aid us with
what lies ahead (Kantrowitz and Naughton 49).
The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics at Santa Clara University in California
has defined ethics in a way that is accessible to those who may not be well versed in
the subject. They make the distinction between what simply feels good and what is
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actually a developed set of ethics.

The website defines ethics in two realms –

community standards and personal study/development. “First, ethics refers to wellbased standards of right and wrong that prescribe what human rights ought to do.” This
would include, for example, the right to personal safety and privacy. It would also
include those activities that would protect other’s rights as well, such as refraining from
“rape, stealing, murder, assault, slander, and fraud.” The Center further defines ethical
standards as including “those that enjoin virtues of honesty, compassion, and loyalty”,
catchphrases that are synonymous with a common understanding of ethics.
“Secondly,” the Center defines ethics as referring to the “study and development of
one's ethical standards”. Since somewhat arbitrary laws, feelings, and social norms can
sometimes oppose, or not quite reflect, what is ethical, it is necessary to “constantly
examine one's standards to ensure that they are reasonable and well-founded”. Simply
put, there is a universal standard that is not necessarily advocated by any one nation,
culture, religion or philosophy.

It is a standard that applies over and above any

temporal authority and cannot be negated, but can be promoted, by religions,
corporations, or governments. It is this ethical standard that we must strive to practice
in our daily lives that will be the bridge by which we can connect with others regardless
of difference.

It is necessary that Americans understand, and are aware of, the

differences that may exist so particular encounters with those differences can be dealt
with respectfully and responsibly (“What is Ethics?”).
Dr. Josina Makau and Dr. Debian Marty of the California State University at
Monterey Bay have developed a simple framework for use in determining ethical
behavior in situations that require the cooperation of those with any degree of difference
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(from personal to ideological to cultural).

Whereas the Markkula Center gives an

overview of what ethics is in the larger picture, Makau and Marty hit the nuts and bolts
of how ethics plays out in everyday life. It is their framework that I believe can form the
basis for the instruction of college students in America.
framework “Cooperative Argumentation.”

They have labeled this

With the term “argumentation” they are

referring not to “emotionally volatile conflicts” but to a “form of combative interaction” –
“combative” referring to an interaction that is outcome based; there is a goal in mind,
which the participants need to reach collaboratively (81).
Cooperative Argumentation is based on an ethic of “interdependence.” What this
means is that in order to use the framework effectively we must

Interdependence
requires that we
“view those who
disagree with us
as resources
rather than as
rivals.”

begin by understanding that cooperation, rather than conflict, is
the easiest way to achieve a goal. We must realize that we
“depend on each other’s perspectives to generate meaning and
a comprehensive understanding” of the issues involved in any
particular decision-making process.

In short, this basis of

interdependence requires that we “view those who disagree with us as resources rather
than as rivals” (Makau and Marty 88).
There are two fundamental aspects to this framework that I believe are
necessary for the student to practice and master in order to gain a full measure of
success. The first is a set of key elements of ethical and effective dialogue and the
second is a set of principles to guide our entry into deliberative situations, as benign or
as critical as they may be. When conflict arises, and it will, we can draw upon these two
aspects of our instruction in ethics to aid our decision-making and collaboration.
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The key elements of ethical and effective dialogue as outlined by Makau and
Marty are fundamental to communication across differences because they outline skills
we can practice that will aid our reception and understanding of perspectives that differ
from our own.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Critical emotions of empathy and compassion
Moral imagination (the capacity to imagine the experiences of others so
deeply that we are able to empathize with them and to experience true
compassion for them)
Nondefensive communication (rather than giving in to escalating and
emotional conflicts we can engage others in productive interactions and
enjoy deeper levels of understanding)
Keeping an open mind
Balanced partiality (to recognize our particular standpoints and
commitments and to account for their potential impact on a dialogue with a
caring dedication to fairness)
Critical self-awareness (the skill that enables us to communicate how we
relate to our social identities and to be responsive to how our identities
might be perceived in a particular dialogue)
Attentive listening (48-64)

These elements of ethical dialogue are skills that can enable us to have meaningful
interactions with those with whom we differ, whether in ideology, ethnicity, or in any
other arena.

They are also skills that can be learned by anyone, regardless of

background, that can enable effective and ethical interactions across those things that
would otherwise impede our development of successful business and personal
relationships. For these reasons I believe they are crucial to a study of ethics and
crucial to the interactions in a multicultural business world.
The set of principles that Makau and Marty outline for cooperative argumentation
are principles I believe to be fundamental to an ethic of cooperation across differences.
•
•

The willingness and capacity to take in others’ perspectives with
nondefensive self-awareness
The ability to present deeply held beliefs with balanced partiality
(understanding that our perspective is only a part of the whole)
15

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Empathic communication skills
Critical thinking abilities
Personal accountability
Care for self and others
Authenticity
Honesty
A commitment to securing the best assessment of the facts, issues, and
circumstances, and to working with others to make the most reasonable,
fair, and just decision possible (105)

It is these elements of ethical dialogue and these principles for sustaining relationships
that form the basis for an understanding of how ethics can aid our successful navigation
of the socio-political relationships of a workforce that thrives on diversity. A study of
ethics can go as far beyond this basis as a particular instructor wishes but if at least
these fundamentals are understood and incorporated into daily practice then the
transition from student to professional can be made much easier and much more
successful.

Thus, navigation of this territory of difference and cooperation can be

strengthened by the knowledge that a return to the fundamentals can aid in the
resolution of any conflict, even when the conflict is over such personal issues as
religion, ethnicity, and power relationships.
A misconception that it is important to clarify at this point is the notion that ethics
is synonymous with religion. This is not the case. “If ethics were confined to religion,”
the Markkula Center states, then “ethics would apply only to religious people” and this is
not the case either. Plenty of people, both religious and not, espouse ethical standards
in their lives. To make ethics synonymous with religion is simply missing the bigger
picture. Most religious traditions entail some form of ethical standard of behavior and
can “provide intense motivations” therein. But ethics, because it is not tied to any
religion, applies to all people regardless of religious preference. Thus, there should be
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no religious reason for not teaching or learning a basic course in ethics because the
relationship to religion, that some assume, is simply not present. In the basis for ethics
education that I have mentioned, nowhere is there a compulsion to believe in any deity
or to support any particular doctrine (“What is Ethics?”).
There is a controversy over the teaching of ethics currently that is twofold:
parents think the matter is best left up to the parents and teachers suffer from an
already overwhelming course load. In this conflict of responsibility sometimes cracks
open up and it is the kids who fall through. The necessity for the instruction is there.
The problem is who should shoulder the burden and how. “The numbers are in and
they don’t look good”, says the Josephson Institute of Ethics after conducting a moral
survey of ethical standards of more than 20,000 middle and high
school students. Steve Johnson, Director of School Programs at
the Markkula Center, reports that “almost half the young people
reported stealing something from a store in the previous 12
months. In the same period, seven out of 10 cheated on an exam”

Children seem
to be having a
tougher and
tougher time
distinguishing
right from
wrong.

(“Issues in Ethics”). These studies show that ethics are lacking in
our young people.

Children seem to be having a tougher and tougher time

distinguishing right from wrong, recognizing consequences, and being able to effectively
deliberate on all possible solutions before making a decision. Can ethics be taught and
will it be effective? The late Harvard psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg thought so. Of
Kohlberg’s many ideas, one broke down our moral development into three stages. The
first stage Kohlberg called the “preconventional level” and defined it as the stage in
which a young child determines what is right and wrong based on what his figures of
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authority tell him is right and wrong. This stage is where children are taught what is
wrong by repetition of the word “no” and by punishments to direct proper behavior
(spanking, scolding, etc) (qtd. in “Can Ethics be Taught?).
The second stage Kohlberg called the “conventional level” in which most
adolescents determine what is right and wrong based on their loyalties to certain
groups: families, school, friends. Now, not only are mom and dad the authority on what
is acceptable behavior; friends, and teachers have input as well. This is the stage
where young kids can begin to have conflicts. What the parents may say is wrong their
friends may say is right and vice versa. Youngsters need to increase their knowledge of
what is right and wrong in each circumstance to be able to navigate their moral lives
without significant damage to interpersonal and community relationships (“Can Ethics
be Taught?).
The third stage Kohlberg called the “postconventional level” in which people have
developed moral principles to guide their determination of right and wrong based on a
more universal point of view. The guiding post for this stage is a basic determination for
ones-self what is acceptable according to more widely held notions of right and wrong.
Through the stages we can see that the net of influence is cast wider and wider,
involving first the parents, then the early social “authorities”, and finally a world full of
norms, values, and expectations. People move up through these stages during different
points in their lives based on their encountered experiences and how well they learn
and can adapt different processing techniques (remembering, deliberating, seeking
options, etc.)

However, Kohlberg’s research has shown that when people are

challenged through classes in ethics they move up through the stages more quickly.
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Life situations become more comfortably handled with skills learned in the third level,
allowing them access to more interdependent problem-solving techniques and to
solutions with more of a relational focus (as opposed to a self-centered focus) (“Can
Ethics be Taught?”). Universal ethics can, and do, differ from social norms in that they
are not bound by social norms but seek to rise above them and embody those values
and principles which are beneficial to humans as a whole and not necessarily to
nations, citizens, members of any particular group or holders of any particular agenda.
Some social norms can rise to the level of hatred of differences and if ethics were
related solely to social norms they would be relative and contradictory (thus, not
universal).

How and why will Ethics Yield Success
For almost all Americans the tragedy of September 11, 2001 will stand as a
benchmark challenge to our ability to cope with the variables of human interaction
spoken of earlier. Following the attacks there was an intense amount of anger and rage
directed toward community members who in any way resembled our attackers. With
headlines like “Why They Hate Us” (Newsweek, 15 October 2001) and “Protecting
America – What Must Be Done” (Newsweek, 5 November 2001) ripping through our
consciousness it is easy to get swept up in the emotional fervor advocating violence and
a continuation of armed conflict. We saw it happen.
According to the Intelligence Project of the Southern Poverty Law Center in
Montgomery, Alabama, hate organizations and groups rose dramatically in 2001, up
12% from the previous year. They have dubbed 2001 the Year of Hate because of the
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marked increase and have noted that the tragedy of
September 11 motivated much of the dramatic increase
(“The Year in Hate”).
Hate groups are nothing new but it is in the shadow of
the loss and anger over September 11 that American
graduates are entering this workforce dominated by
differences.

Can we cope?

Do we even know what

challenges await us? A website geared for fighting hate and
promoting tolerance, www.tolerance.org, has developed a fast-paced, automatic-reflex,
test designed to help you determine your awareness of racial issues and your
unconscious biases – your tendency to be biased for or against a particular racial group.
Understanding that all tests are necessarily subjective and concrete results from webbased tests like this are difficult, at best, to incorporate into any study of human
behavior, the results were interesting and can serve as a way to begin thinking about
ones unconscious biases and prejudices. Even though I would think of myself as being
a fairly unbiased person when it comes to racial issues, I took the test designed to show
any bias for or against the Arab Muslim racial identity (the website offers tests on
various racial identities). The test results determined that, when given the situation, I
would be preferential toward people not of that racial identity (See Appendix I). I was
surprised, yes, but so would most of us be if our unconscious biases were known. We
can only begin to work with them once our biases are realized. This is a crucial element
of the critical self-awareness spoken of earlier.
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As if racial issues hadn’t always been at the forefront of general conflict in this
country, now we have yet another group of people toward which our frustrations and
anger get aimed. Men are being attacked at their places of business because they
happen to fit the Middle Eastern visual demographic (Ellison). Muslim women are afraid
of being attacked because they continue to wear hijabs (traditional Muslim headcovering for women) or simply because of their skin color (Stammer). Arab-American
men are being escorted off planes before takeoff because some other passenger
doesn’t feel comfortable with their presence (Brown). Ahmed Wardak, a 40 year old
business owner in Reseda, CA, left Afghanistan for America to escape the fighting and
still encounters a difficult life in America because of the backlash against Muslim
Americans post-September 11. “The people,” he says, “they think we’re all the same
and they give us a hard time. They think if you’re Muslim you are on bin Laden’s side.
It’s not true. Hitler was white but we don’t say all white people are like Hitler” (Cohen).
In this new atmosphere of heightened tensions we come to realize that we still
have to conduct daily business and, inevitably, we will have dealings with people who
are different from us. So, how is a study of ethics going to help us in this multicultural
workforce, understanding that hate exists and maybe not all people want to be
cooperative? It will start by giving us a framework to accept and cope with differences.
For generations in America we have labeled people: the “Hippie Generation”, the “Me
Generation”, “Generation X”, and now, according to a recent cover story of Newsweek
Magazine, “Generation 9-11” (Kantrowitz and Naughton 47). It is this mentality that we
as a nation use to name groups of people that strips that particular group of its
complexity and, consequently, of its beauty.

A study of ethics will give us the
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terminology and the practice to be able to deal effectively and compassionately with
new and, sometimes, uncomfortable situations.

Yes, it is a reality that our world is

getting smaller in the fact that we can no longer stick our head in the sand of our small
communities and pretend we are the only civilized ones in the world. Our everyday
lives depend on people we cannot see, from around the world, whom we may not be
able to understand or even want to sometimes. But, it is imperative that we understand,
and remember, “evil does not wear a turban, a tunic, a yarmulke or a cross. Evil wears
the garment of a human heart woven from the threads of hate and fear” (Baxter 75).
Just because we don’t understand something or someone doesn’t mean they are wrong
and we are right, it just means we are different. If we can acknowledge that one fact
then we are halfway to an open mind and a whole world of new and beneficial
relationships.
Perhaps the best reason why teaching ethics is effective is noted by psychologist
James Rest on the Markkula Center website. Rest has summarized the important data
as follows:
•
•
•
•
•

Dramatic changes occur in young adults in their 20s and 30s in terms of the
basic problem-solving strategies they use to deal with ethical issues.
These changes are linked to fundamental changes in how a person perceives
society and his or her role in society.
The extent to which change occurs is associated with the number of years of
formal educaton [sic] (college or professional school).
Deliberate educational attempts (formal curriculum) to influence awareness of
moral problems and to influence the reasoning or judgement [sic] process have
been demonstrated to be effective.
Studies indicate that a person's behavior is influenced by his or her moral
perception and moral judgements [sic] (“Can Ethics be Taught?”).

There are always opportunities to better our understanding of things in this world.
Education has brought my generation to where we are today, on the verge of
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graduation, headed into a new world of possibilities. Why would education not continue
to aid our success as we make our transition into the professional world? The Markkula
Center, and others, illustrates what ethics is and is not. Nuts and bolts outlines, such as
Doctors Makau and Marty have given us, can assist our interpersonal relationships in
our various occupations. The key is realizing that education is not simply within the
walls of a designated institution – it is within life.
Part of that education must include the concept of the “interracial ally.” This is a
relatively new concept and definitions are as various as the identities of those who
speak or write on the subject. The consensus seems to be that an interracial ally is,
most simply, a sincere and compassionate person who is committed to struggling
against oppression by taking the heat with, and for, anyone of a minority status (Scott
19; Calderon 15).

This is an important and effective method of creating safe and

cooperative working environments. An interracial ally should be a person who is willing
to take risks and be in the fight for the long haul, not just when it feels comfortable or
only in extreme cases (Calderon 15; Ayvazian 614). It should become a way of life not
just a way of coping or dealing with any particular situation. This person should also be
respectful, engaging, conducive to open communication and to the repairing of
relationships (Calderon 15; Scott 19).
An interracial ally should understand that s/he might have been socialized in a
way that is not conducive to smooth race relations. S/he should be willing to help create
the conditions for learning and should be willing to un-learn damaging socialization if
necessary.

This is part of what Charlotte Bunch calls the “difference justifies

domination” concept. It is an inherent socialization that because one is part of the
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dominant group and is in association with members of another group, those of the
dominant group have a de facto right to be in charge (Bunch 288). That is simply not a
valid way of conducting any relationship these days, business or personal. There is a
need, in assuming the role of an interracial ally, to understand the interconnectedness
with our co-workers, friends, and fellow humans in order to gracefully and humbly
become part of a group where one is not necessarily always in charge simply because
of color or nationality.
There are plenty of incentives to becoming an interracial ally, one of the most
important of which is to learn the skills necessary to release one’s self from what Peggy
McIntosh calls the “invisible knapsack.” This “invisible package” is what McIntosh terms
as white racism and contains such “unearned assets which [a white person] can count
on cashing in each day, but about which [we were] ‘meant’ to remain oblivious”
(McIntosh 97).

As middle-class, white people in America we have, through the

decades, acquired certain privileges, based on our skin color, that are both unfair and
unearned, that account for a somewhat skewed vision of our place in society. These
unearned privileges are so inherent to our lives that we don’t even think they are
harmful – and yet they are. They are the unstated privileges that allow us, sometimes,
to get a job over a more qualified minority, to not have to think in terms of our color, to
judge ourselves as the “norm”, to not think twice about prejudice or discrimination
against us. It is not because these privileges give us bad things that they are harmful
because what we acquire from our privilege is usually good. They are harmful because
they are solely based on our skin color and because the fact that we have access to
those privileges means that someone else doesn’t. By recognizing the contents of our
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own “invisible knapsacks” we can understand how it is usually the small things and not
the large offenses that propagate racism on a daily basis. Then we can begin to make
a change.
A second very important incentive to becoming an interracial ally is developing
the ability to build coalitions that work toward a common vision (Bunch 293). Once
differences can be acknowledged without either putting them aside or making them the
center of a relationship, we can begin to build those bridges that will connect us as
human beings. It is then that we become productive over and above those issues that
once kept us apart.
Now that we have determined the need for ethics and a framework for a basis in

Diversity
typically
means a
collection of
people who
differ in their
identities.
But it is more.

its instruction, what exactly would ethics look like when
transferred to the corporate organization? The best examples
have been the implementations of diversity training programs
in corporations from the top down, CEO to field worker. In an
article for the journal Training & Development, Anthony
Carnevale and Susan Stone explore the idea of workplace

diversity and exactly what it means. The word diversity typically means a collection of
people who differ in their identities.

“But it is more,” say Carnevale and Stone.

“Diversity is a process of acknowledging differences through action. In organizations,
this involves welcoming heterogeneity by developing a variety of initiatives at the
management and organizational levels as well as at the interpersonal (individual and
intergroup) levels” (par. 1). And it is more than just an implementation of current Equal
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Employment Opportunity (EEO) and affirmative action policies. These authors insist
that it must be proactive and not merely punitive, as are current practices.
Using the work of “organizational expert” Taylor Cox Jr., of the University of
Michigan, they advocate a twofold proactive method of fostering a healthy work
atmosphere they call “valuing and managing diversity.” Valuing diversity is a process by
which the primary focus is not self- but other-centered. Beyond the Golden Rule of
treating others as you would like to be treated, valuing diversity goes a step further and
involves treating others as they would like to be treated. Managing diversity involves
implementing the valuing of diversity at all levels within the organization. “It means
managing in a way that maximizes the potential benefits of diversity and minimizes the
potential disadvantages” and it intrinsically “implies a measure of uncertainty.” Valuing
and managing diversity must mean constant and proactive initiatives to engage and
integrate workers at all levels. As long as there is something new to be learned, and
there always will be, there will also be an increased need to be flexible about the
process while still keeping the goal in sight (Carnevale and Stone, par. 13).
Ethics is a little known and misunderstood part of a small number of curricula
around the world and is controversial in its real or assumed relationship to religion,
especially in light of our nation’s avid separation of Church and State. Regardless of
people’s inhibitions about dealing with ethics in an educational atmosphere, it can be
one of the most enlightening experiences for our next generation of professionals. It is
a system by which one can learn about oneself as well as how to ethically,
compassionately, and successfully communicate with someone of a different
perspective without overlooking differences or allowing those differences to interfere
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with an intended, and mutual, goal. The frameworks for ethical practices outlined by
Josina Makau, Debian Marty, Anthony Carnevale, and Susan Stone can be a very
accessible way to set a foundation for teaching ethics in universities as a part of the
undergraduate experience – regardless of a student’s intended concentration; ethics
can work anywhere.
In the aftermath of September 11th we have experienced a very rude awakening
in this country. We have seen the best and the worst that a tragedy can bring out of our
people – from selfless rescue personnel to racist murderers. It is a wakeup call that we
must heed – without a sense of cooperative productivity, we as a nation will continue
into isolation and will decline economically, culturally, and spiritually. A study in ethics
can help us to achieve the language, the theories, and the practice to be able to
conduct ourselves in a professional realm that is ever-increasingly multicultural.
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Appendix I

Your data suggest a slight automatic preference for
Other peoples
The score above has already been corrected for the order that you performed the task. If your score was 'Inconclusive',
click here. Compare your score above with the distribution of all respondents scores below.

Interpretation

Percent of Total

Strong automatic preference for Arab Muslims

20%

Moderate automatic preference for Arab Muslims

12%

Slight automatic preference for Arab Muslims

21%

Little to no automatic preference

25%

Slight automatic preference for Other peoples

9%

Moderate automatic preference for Other peoples

6%

Strong automatic preference for Other peoples

7%

If your test showed a "preference" for a group, the result points to a hidden, or unconscious bias. The results of over one
million tests show that unconcious bias exists in most of us.

This new test was prompted by the events of September 11, 2001. Suicide pilots, identified as Arab Muslims, crashed
airplanes into the World Trade Centers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. killing about 4,000
people. That attack, and the military response by the United States and other countries in Afghanistan have surely
influenced conscious and unconscious beliefs and attitudes.
At this website, we have placed a single test to provide an indication of implicit attitudes toward Arab Muslims. We
constructed this test of attitude toward Arab Muslims relative to a category consisting of "other peoples" from around the
world. Unfortunately, we do not have data on implicit attitudes toward Arab Muslims prior to September 11, with which the
attitudes since can be compared. Nevertheless, we introduce this test at www.tolerance.org because we expect that the
events of September 11 and its aftermath open a new chapter in the history of the relations among world communities that
differ in religious, political, and social ideology. As with other tests at this site, this one may provide insight into implicit
attitudes that may not be in line with conscious attitudes or desired attitudes.

http://www.tolerance.org/hidden_bias/02.html
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Appendix II

DO what is right, not what is easiest.

DON’T act in anger, take time out.

DO learn about other cultures history,
and habits before judging.

DON’T interrupt when others try to
explain.

DO ensure that both sides have equal say.

DON’T patronize, show respect.

DO respect differences of opinion.

DON’T look down on others, be level.

DO listen when others try to explain.

DON’T be judgmental, be fair.

DO understand that you can be wrong.

DON’T ridicule differing beliefs and
attitudes.

DO try to understand and be appreciative.

DON’T dominate, try to accommodate.

DO take responsibility for your own
action or inaction.

DON’T ignore diversity, try to
understand it.

DO ask questions, but politely.

DON’T be insulting, be appreciative.

DO remember others have feelings, too.

DON’T divide people, integrate them.

M.K. Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence
650 East Parkway South
Memphis, Tennessee 38104
www.gandhiinstitute.org
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Appendix III

Commitment to Combat Oppression
Check the appropriate column.
YES

NO

____

____

Have I aggressively sought out more information in an effort to enhance my own
awareness and understanding of others (talking with others, reading, listening)?

____

____

Have I spent some time recently looking at my own collusion with oppressive
attitudes and behavior as they contribute to or combat oppression and prejudice
around me?

____

____

Have I reevaluated my use of terms of phrases that may be perceived by others
as degrading or hurtful?

____

____

Have I openly disagreed with an oppressive or prejudice comment, joke, or
action among those around me?

____

____

Have I made a personal contract with myself to take a positive stand, even at
some possible risk, when the chance occurs?

____

____

Have I suggested and taken steps to implement discussions or workshops aimed
at understanding oppression and prejudice with friends, colleagues, social clubs
or church groups?

____

____

Have I been investigating political candidates at all levels in terms of their stance
and activity against oppressive and prejudiced government practices?

____

____

Have I investigated curricula or local schools in terms of their treatment of the
issue of oppression (also textbooks, assemblies, faculty, staff, administration)?

____

____

Have I contributed time and/or funds to an agency, fund or program that actively
confronts the problems of oppression and prejudice?

____

____

Have my buying habits supported non-oppressive shops, companies, or
personnel?

____

____

Is my place of employment a target for my educational efforts in responding to
oppression and prejudice?

____

____

Have I become seriously dissatisfied with my own level of activity in combating
oppression and prejudice?

The Dialogue Consultants, LLC, P.O. Box 12931, La Jolla, CA 92039
http://www.dialogue-consultants.com
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WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2001: PROMOTING LINKAGES
OVERVIEW
THE GEOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION
FDI flows reached record levels in 2000…
Foreign direct investment (FDI) continues to expand rapidly, enlarging the role of international
production in the world economy. FDI grew by 18 per cent in 2000, faster than other economic aggregates like
world production, capital formation and trade, reaching a record $1.3 trillion (table 1). FDI flows are, however,
expected to decline in 2001.
The global expansion of investment flows is driven by more than 60,000 transnational corporations
(TNCs) with over 800,000 affiliates abroad. Developed countries remain the prime destination of FDI,
accounting for more than three-quarters of global inflows. Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As)
remain the main stimulus behind FDI, and these are still concentrated in the developed countries. As a result,
inflows to developed countries increased by 21 per cent and amounted to a little over $1 trillion. FDI inflows to
developing countries also rose, reaching $240 billion. However, their share in world FDI flows declined for the
second year in a row, to 19 per cent, compared to the peak of 41 per cent in 1994. The countries in Central
and Eastern Europe, with inflows of $27 billion, maintained their share of 2 per cent. The 49 least developed
countries (LDCs) remained marginal in terms of attracting FDI, with 0.3 per cent of world inflows in 2000.
Within the developed world, the Triad - the European Union (EU), the United States and Japan accounted for 71 per cent of world inflows and 82 per cent of outflows in 2000 (table 2). Within the Triad, the
EU has gained both as a recipient and source of FDI. Record inflows ($617 billion) were stimulated by further
progress in regional integration, while the United States and other Western European countries remain its main
partners outside the region. Due to the take-over of Mannesmann by VodafoneAirTouch - the largest crossborder merger deal so far - Germany became, for the first time, the largest recipient of FDI in Europe. The
United Kingdom maintained its position as the top source country worldwide for a second year. The United
States remained the world’s largest FDI recipient country as inflows reached $281 billion. Outflows with $139
billion decreased by 2 per cent. Japan saw its inflows in 2000 drop by 36 per cent from the previous year to $8
billion, partly due to the prolonged slow-down of the country’s economic growth, but also perhaps indicative of
the fact that, in spite of its welcoming FDI policies, other factors deter investment inflows. In contrast,
outflows from Japan rebounded to $33 billion, the highest level in ten years. Among other developed countries,
the most conspicuous events were the unprecedented levels of FDI into and from Canada, reflecting several
major M&A deals, in particular with partners in Europe and the United States.
There were major differences in FDI trends among developing countries. In contrast to the experience
in most other parts of the world, inflows to Africa (including South Africa) declined in 2000 (for the first time
since the mid-1990s), from $10.5 billion to $9.1 billion. As a result, the share of Africa in total FDI flows fell
below 1 per cent. The decline was mainly related to two countries: South Africa and Angola. In the former
country, fewer privatization and M&A deals caused the slow-down, while in the latter, inflows in the petroleum
sector declined. The Southern African Development Community maintained its position as the most important
subregion for FDI inflows in Africa. Its share in total FDI inflows into Africa was 44 per cent, compared to 21
per cent in the first half of the 1990s. The Community’s improved attractiveness to FDI may have been
principally driven by country-specific factors, but at least some FDI inflows were also motivated by the
economic integration of the region.
After tripling during the second half of the 1990s, FDI flows into Latin America and the Caribbean
also fell in 2000, by 22 per cent, to $86 billion. This was mainly a correction from 1999 - when FDI inflows
into the region were greatly affected by three major cross-border acquisitions of Latin American firms - rather
than a shift in the underlying trend. Privatization slowed down in 2000, but continues to be important as a factor
driving inward FDI. In terms of sectors, FDI into South America was mainly in services and
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Table 1. Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 1982-2000
(Billions of dollars and percentage)
Value at current prices
(Billions of dollars)
1982
1990
2000
FDI inflows
FDI outflows
FDI inward stock
FDI outward stock
a
Cross border M&As
Sales of foreign affiliates
Gross product of foreign affiliates
Total assets of foreign affiliates
Export of foreign affiliates
Employment of foreign affiliates (thousands)

57
37
719
568
..
2 465
565
1 888
637
17 454

5
1
5
1
23

GDP at factor cost
Gross fixed capital formation
Royalties and Licences fees receipts
Export of goods and non-factor services

10 612
2 236
9
2 124

21 475
4 501
27
4 381

1
1

202
235
889
717
151
467
420
744
166
721

1
1
6
5
1
15
3
21
3
45

271
150
314
976
144
680
167
102
572
587

31 895
6 466
66
7 036

Annual growth rate
(Per cent)
1991-1995 1996-1999
1998

1986-1990
23.0
26.2
16.2
20.5
26.4
15.6
16.4
18.2
13.2
5.7

c
d
e
f
g

b

11.7
12.2
22.1
15.4

h
h
h

1999

20.8
16.3
9.3
10.8
23.3
10.5
7.2
13.9
14.0
5.3

40.8
37.0
16.9
16.4
50.0
10.4
11.0
15.9
11.0
7.8

44.9
52.8
19.8
20.9
74.4
18.2
3.2
23.4
11.8
16.8

55.2
41.3
22.3
19.5
44.1
17.2
27.2
14.8
16.1
5.3

6.3
6.6
14.1
8.6

0.7
0.6
4.0
1.9

-0.9
-0.6
6.1
-1.5

3.4
4.3
1.1
3.9

2000

c
d
e
f
g

18.2
14.3
21.5
19.4
49.3
18.0
16.5
19.8
17.9
12.7

c
d
e
f
g

6.1
..
..
..

S o u r c e : U N C T A D , W o r l d I n v e s t m e n t R e p o r t 2 0 0 1 : P r o m o t i n g L i n k a g e s , table I.1, p. 10.
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h

Data are only available from 1987 onward.
1987-1990 only
Based on the following regression result of sales against FDI inward stock for the period 1982-1998: Sales=967+2.462*FDI inward stock.
Based on the following regression result of gross product against FDI inward stock for the period 1982-1998: Gross product=412+0.461*FDI inward stock.
Based on the following regression result of assets against FDI inward stock for the period 1982-1998: Assets= -376+3.594*FDI inward stock.
Based on the following regression result of exports against FDI inward stock for the period 1982-1998: Exports=231+0.559*FDI inward stock.
Based on the following regression result of employment against FDI inward stock for the period 1982-1998: Employment=13 925+5.298*FDI inward stock.
Data are for 1999.

Note:
N o t i n c l u d e d in this table a r e t h e v a l u e o f w o r l d w i d e s a l e s b y f o r e i g n affiliates a s s o c i a t e d with their p a r e n t firms t h r o u g h n o n - e q u i t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s a n d
the s a l e s o f the p a r e n t f i r m s t h e m s e l v e s . W o r l d w i d e s a l e s , g r o s s p r o d u c t , total a s s e t s , e x p o r t s a n d e m p l o y m e n t o f f o r e i g n affiliates a r e estimated b y
e x t r a p o l a t i n g t h e w o r l d w i d e data o f f o r e i g n affiliates o f T N C s f r o m F r a n c e , G e r m a n y , Italy, J a p a n a n d the U n i t e d S t a t e s ( f o r s a l e s a n d e m p l o y m e n t ) a n d
those f r o m J a p a n a n d t h e U n i t e d States ( f o r e x p o r t s ) , t h o s e f r o m the U n i t e d States ( f o r g r o s s p r o d u c t ) , a n d t h o s e f r o m G e r m a n y a n d t h e U n i t e d States ( f o r
assets) on the basis of the shares of those countries in the worldwide outward FDI stock.
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Table 2. Regional distribution of FDI inflows and outflows, 1989-2000
(Billions of dollars)
FDI inflows
Region/country

Developed countries
Western Europe
European Union
Other Western Europe
Japan
United States
Developing countries and economies
Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
Asia and the Pacific
Asia
West Asia
Central Asia
South, East and South-East Asia
South Asia
The Pacific
Developing Europe
Central and Eastern Europe
World

1989-1994
(Annual average)

1995

1996

1997

FDI outflows
1998

1999

2000

1989-1994
1995
(Annual average)

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

137.1
79.8
76.6
3.1
1.0
42.5

203.5
117.2
113.5
3.7
58.8

219.7
114.9
109.6
5.2
0.2
84.5

271.4
137.5
127.6
9.9
3.2
103.4

483.2
273.4
261.1
12.3
3.3
174.4

829.8
485.3
467.2
18.2
12.7
295.0

1 005.2
633.2
617.3
15.8
8.2
281.1

203.2
114.2
105.2
9.0
29.6
49.0

305.8
173.6
159.0
14.6
22.5
92.1

332.9
204.3
183.2
21.1
23.4
84.4

396.9
242.4
220.4
22.0
26.1
95.8

672.0
475.2
454.3
21.0
24.2
131.0

59.6
4.0
17.5
37.9
37.7
2.2
0.4
35.1
0.8
0.2
0.2

113.3
4.7
32.3
75.9
75.3
1.7
73.6
2.9
0.6
0.5

152.5
5.6
51.3
94.5
94.4
2.9
2.1
89.4
3.7
0.2
1.1

187.4
7.2
71.2
107.3
107.2
5.5
3.2
98.5
4.9
0.1
1.7

188.4
7.7
83.2
95.9
95.6
6.6
3.0
86.0
3.5
0.3
1.6

222.0
9.0
110.3
100.0
99.7
0.9
2.6
96.2
3.1
0.3
2.7

240.2
8.2
86.2
143.8
143.5
3.4
2.7
137.3
3.0
0.3
2.0

24.9
0.9
3.7
20.3
20.3
0.3
20.0
-

49.0
0.5
7.3
41.1
41.1
- 1.0
0.3
41.8
0.1
-

57.6
0.0
5.5
51.9
51.9
2.3
0.0
49.7
0.3
0.1

65.7
1.7
14.4
49.4
49.4
- 0.3
0.2
49.5
0.1
0.2

37.7
0.9
8.0
28.7
28.6
- 1.7
0.3
30.0
0.1
0.1
0.1

58.0
0.6
21.8
35.5
35.4
0.7
0.3
34.4
0.1
0.1
0.1

99.5
0.7
13.4
85.3
85.2
1.3
0.3
83.6
0.3
0.0
0.1

3.4

14.3

12.7

19.2

21.0

23.2

25.4

0.1

0.5

1.0

3.4

2.1

2.1

4.0

200.1

331.1

384.9

477.9

692.5 1 075.0

1 270.8

228.3

355.3

391.6

466.0

711.9

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages , annex tables B.1 and B.2, pp. 291 to 296.
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945.7 1 046.3
761.1 820.3
720.1 772.9
41.1
47.4
22.7
32.9
142.6 139.3

1 005.8 1 149.9

natural resources, while Mexico continued to receive the largest share of inflows in manufacturing as well as in
banking.
In developing Asia, FDI inflows reached a record level of $143 billion in 2000. The greatest increase
took place in East Asia; Hong Kong (China), in particular, experienced an unprecedented FDI boom, with
inflows amounting to $64 billion, making it the top FDI recipient in Asia as well as in developing countries. This
upsurge in inflows has several explanations. First, it reflects a recovery from the economic turmoil of the recent
past. Second, TNCs planning to invest in mainland China have been “parking” funds in Hong Kong (China), in
anticipation of China’s expected entry into the WTO. Third, the increase reflects a major cross-border M&A in
telecommunications, which alone accounted for nearly one-third of the territory’s total FDI inflows. Fourth,
there is an element of increased “round-tripping” of capital flows into, and out of Hong Kong (China).
FDI flows to China, at $41 billion, remained fairly stable. In the course of its negotiations for
membership in the WTO, China has amended some of its FDI policies. TNCs play an increasingly important
role in the Chinese economy; for example, tax contributions by foreign affiliates accounted for 18 per cent ($27
billion) of the country’s total corporate tax revenues in 2000. Inflows to South-East Asia (ASEAN-10) remained
below the pre-crisis level. The subregion’s share in total FDI flows to developing Asia continued to shrink, and
stood in 2000 at 10 per cent, as compared with over 30 per cent in the mid-1990s. This was largely due to
rising inflows into other countries in the region and significant divestments in Indonesia since the onset of the
financial crisis. South Asia witnessed a drop in FDI inflows by 1 per cent over the previous year. India, the
largest recipient in the subcontinent, received $2 billion. Notwithstanding these mixed trends, the longer-term
investment prospects for developing Asia remain bright. In addition to the quality of the underlying determinants
for FDI, greater economic integration is likely to boost FDI in the region.
Outward FDI from developing Asia doubled in 2000, to $85 billion. Hong Kong (China) was the most
important source ($63 billion); more than half of its outward FDI went to China. Outward FDI from China and
India also picked up.
FDI inflows into Central and Eastern Europe also rose, to an unprecedented $27 billion. Privatizationrelated transactions were a key determinant of FDI inflows throughout the region, with the exception of
Hungary, where the privatization process has by and large run its course, and the Commonwealth of
Independent States, where large-scale privatizations involving foreign investors have yet to begin. Outflows
from the region expanded even faster than inflows, in spite of the fact that official data on outward FDI are
likely to underestimate the actual outflows. (Some FDI by firms in the Russian Federation go unreported, or are
reported under other elements of the balance of payments.)
...but a mapping of the geography of FDI patterns shows that international production is highly
concentrated…
A mapping of FDI inflows indicates the extent to which host countries are integrating into the
globalizing world economy. It also indicates indirectly the distribution of benefits from FDI. The mapping of
outward FDI shows which countries control the global distribution of this investment. Understanding the pattern
of FDI flows and stocks and its driving forces is important for the formulation and implementation of economic
strategies and policies.
A comparison of the world maps of inward and outward FDI in 2000 and 1985 reveals that FDI
reaches many more countries in a substantial manner than in the past. More than 50 countries (24 of which are
developing countries) have an inward stock of more than $10 billion, compared with only 17 countries 15 years
ago (7 of them developing countries). The picture for outward FDI is similar: the number of countries with
stocks exceeding $10 billion rose from 10 to 33 (now including 12 developing countries, compared to 8 in
1985) over the same period. In terms of flows, the number of countries receiving an annual average of more
than $1 billion rose from 17 (6 of which were developing countries) in the mid-1980s to 51 (23 of which were
developing countries) at the end of the 1990s. In the case of outflows, 33 countries (11 developing countries)
invested more than $1 billion at the end of the 1990s, compared to 13 countries (only one developing country)
in the mid-1980s.
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Despite its reach, however, FDI is unevenly distributed. The world’s top 30 host countries account for
95 per cent of total world FDI inflows and 90 per cent of stocks. The top 30 home countries account for
around 99 per cent of outward FDI flows and stocks, mainly industrialized economies. About 90 of the world’s
largest 100 non-financial TNCs in terms of foreign assets are headquartered in the Triad (see table 3 for the top
25 of those firms). More than half of these companies are in the electrical and electronic equipment, motor
vehicle, and petroleum exploration and distribution industries. These TNCs play an important role in international
production: they accounted (in 1999) for approximately 12 per cent, 16 per cent and 15 per cent of the foreign
assets, sales and employment, respectively, of the world’s 60,000 plus TNCs. General Electric maintained in
1999 its position as the largest TNC in the world. For the first time, three companies from developing countries
(Hutchison Whampoa, Petróleos de Venezuela and Cemex) are among the world’s 100 largest TNCs. The
transnationalization of companies is a phenomenon increasingly observed not only in developed countries but
also in the developing world. The top 50 TNCs from developing countries - the largest of which are comparable
in size to the smallest of the top 100 worldwide - originate in some 13 newly industrializing economies of Asia
and Latin America as well as in South Africa (see table 4 for the top 10 of those firms). They congregate in
construction, food and beverages, and diversified industries. The largest 25 TNCs from Central and Eastern
Europe are somewhat more evenly distributed among nine home countries (see table 5 for the top 10 of those
firms). Transport, mining, petroleum and gas and chemicals and pharmaceuticals are the most frequently
represented industries among these TNCs. The transnationality index for the three groups of TNCs shows some
divergent patterns. The degree of transnationalization increased for both the top 50 TNCs and the top 25: from
37 per cent in 1998 to 39 per cent in 1999 in the case of the former; and from 26 per cent to 32 per cent in the
case of the latter. The transnationality of the top 100 TNCs remained fairly stable at a high level (53 per cent).
The locational patterns of international production differ by country and industry, and they change over
time, partly in response to the shifting industrial composition of FDI. During the past ten years, services have
become more important in international production because this sector has been liberalized for FDI relatively
recently. In 1999, they accounted for more than half of the total stock of inward FDI in developed countries
and some one-third of that in developing countries. In many service industries, FDI tends to be spread
relatively widely, reflecting the importance of proximity to customers. The same applies to some manufacturing
industries, in which access to the domestic market is the predominant reason for investing abroad. However,
the more advanced the level of technology in an industry, the higher the level of concentration tends to be. For
example, if one takes six industries representing different technological levels (semiconductors, biotechnology,
automobiles, TV and radio receivers, food and beverages, and textiles and clothing), an industrial mapping
shows FDI in biotechnology as highly concentrated (figure 1), followed by semiconductors and televisions and
radio receivers. In comparison, the food and beverages industry is more evenly spread among host countries
(figure 2). Foreign affiliates in high-technology industries tend to agglomerate in selected locations in the world.
This reflects differences in the industrial distribution of FDI in the manufacturing sector between developed and
developing countries. In the developed countries, chemicals is the largest recipient industry, while in developing
countries FDI is concentrated in low-technology industries.
At the functional level, geographical patterns of FDI reflect efficiency considerations of TNCs in the
light of increasing competitive pressures, coupled with technological advances that enable real-time links across
long distances and the liberalization of trade and FDI policies. This encourages a greater spread of all corporate
functions. Even such critical corporate functions as design, R&D and financial management are today becoming
increasingly internationalized to optimize cost, efficiency and flexibility. Take, for example, the location of
regional headquarters. Singapore and Hong Kong (China) have attracted a number of regional headquarters to
serve the Asian region, with the first location hosting some 200 regional headquarters, and the second 855 in
2000. In some industries, TNCs have set up integrated international production systems with an intra-firm
international division of labour spanning regions (as in automobiles) or
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Table 3.

Ranking 1999 by: Ranked in 1998 by:
Foreign
Foreign
a
a
assets
TNI
assets
TNI
Corporation
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

75
22
43
83
77
82
51
21
50
18
2
45
11
41
90
55
13
59
58
32
3
42
9
8
49
Source:

1
5
3
2
4
6
9
32
7
8
10
11
19
14
17
87
13
23
15
20
34
12
-

75
19
45
85
76
60
59
27
54
21
3
51
52
73
17
84
63
40
8
41
1
7
-

General Electric
ExxonMobil Corporation
c
Royal Dutch/Shell Group
General Motors
Ford Motor Company
Toyota Motor Corporation
DaimlerChrysler AG
Total Fina SA
IBM
BP
Nestlé S.A.
Volkswagen Group
Nippon Mitsubishi Oil Corporation (Nippon Oil Co. Ltd)
Siemens AG
Wal-Mart Stores
Repsol SA
Diageo Plc
Mannesmann AG
Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux
BMW AG
ABB
Sony Corporation
Seagram Company
Unilever
Aventis

The world's 25 largest TNCs, ranked by foreign assets, 1999
(Billions of dollars and number of employees)
Assets
b

Country

Industry

United States
United States
The Netherlands/United Kingdom
United States
United States
Japan
Germany
France
United States
United Kingdom
Switzerland
Germany
Japan
Germany
United States
Spain
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Germany
Switzerland
Japan
Canada
United Kingdom/The Netherlands
France

Electronics
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Motor vehicles
Motor vehicles
Motor vehicles
Motor vehicles
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Computers
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Food/beverages
Motor vehicles
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Electronics
Retailing
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Beverages
Telecommunications/engineering
Diversified/utility
Motor vehicles
Electrical equipment
Electronics
Beverages/media
Food/beverages
Pharmaceuticals/chemicals

Foreign
141.1
99.4
68.7
68.5
...
56.3
55.7
...
44.7
39.3
33.1
...
31.5
...
30.2
29.6
28.0
...
...
27.1
27.0
...
25.6
25.3
...

Sales

Total
405.2
144.5
113.9
274.7
273.4
154.9
175.9
77.6
87.5
52.6
36.8
64.3
35.5
76.6
50.0
42.1
40.4
57.7
71.6
39.2
30.6
64.2
35.0
28.0
39.0

Foreign
32.7
115.5
53.5
46.5
50.1
60.0
122.4
31.6
50.4
57.7
45.9
47.8
28.4
53.2
19.4
9.1
16.4
11.8
9.7
26.8
23.8
43.1
12.3
38.4
4.7

Employment

Total
111.6
160.9
105.4
176.6
162.6
119.7
151.0
39.6
87.6
83.5
46.7
70.6
33.9
72.2
137.6
26.3
19.0
21.8
23.5
36.7
24.4
63.1
11.8
44.0
19.2

Foreign

Total

143 000 310 000
68 000 107 000
57 367
99 310
162 300 398 000
191 486 364 550
13 500 214 631
225 705 466 938
50 538
74 437
161 612 307 401
62 150
80 400
224 554 230 929
147 959 306 275
11 900
15 964
251 000 443 000
... 1 140 000
...
29 262
59 852
72 479
58 694 130 860
150 000 220 000
46 104 114 952
155 427 161 430
115 717 189 700
...
...
222 614 246 033
...
92 446

UNCTAD/Erasmus University database.

a

TNI is the abbreviation for 'transnationality index'. The transnationlity index is calculated as the average of three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and foreign employment to total employment.
Industry classification for companies follows the United States Standard Industrial Classification as used by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
c
Foreign assets, sales and employment are outside Europe.
d
Foreign assets, sales and employment are outside Australia and Asia.
e
Foreign assets, sales and employment are outside North-America.
f
Foreign employment is outside Europe, Australia and New Zealand.
… Data on foreign assets, foreign sales and foreign employment were not made available for the purpose of this study. In case of non-availability, they are estimated using secondary sources of information
or on the basis of the ratios of foreign to total assets, foreign to total sales and foreign to total employment.
b

Note The list includes non-financial TNCs only. In some companies, foreign investors may hold a minority share of more than 10 per cent.
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TNI

a

(Per cent)
36.7
68.0
56.3
30.7
36.1
30.9
53.7
70.3
53.7
73.7
95.2
55.7
82.4
56.8
25.8
51.6
79.4
48.9
49.1
60.9
94.1
56.7
88.6
89.3
54.0

Table 4. The largest 10 TNCs from developing economies, ranked by foreign assets, 1999
(Millions of dollars, number of employees)
Ranking by
Foreign
assets
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

TNI

Assets
a

24
30
10
39
34
13
22
45
43
42

b

Corporation

Economy

Industry

Hutchison Whampoa Limited
Petroleos De Venezuela
Cemex S.A. (Cementos Mexicanos S.A.)
Petronas - Petroliam Nasional Berhad
Samsung Corporation
Daewoo Corporation
Lg Electronics Inc.
Sunkyong Group
New World Development Co., Ltd.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

Hong Kong, China
Venezuela
Mexico
Malaysia
Korea, Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Republic of

Diversified
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Construction
Petroleum expl./ref./distr.
Diversified/Trade
Diversified/Trade
Electronics and electrical equipment
Energy/Trading/Chemicals
Construction
Electronics and electrical equipment

Foreign
..
8 009
6 973
..
5 127
..
4 215
4 214
4 097
3 907

Sales
Total Foreign

48 532
47 250
11 896
31 992
21 581
16 460
17 273
34 542
14 789
25 487

2 107
13 332
2 504
..
6 339
..
6 383
10 762
368
5 214

Employment
Total Foreign

7 132
32 600
4 841
15 957
37 180
18 618
15 590
43 457
2 259
28 024

..
15 000
..
..
1 911
..
27 000
2 273
788
6 039

TNI

a

Total (Per cent)
42 510
47 760
20 902
18 578
4 600
12 021
50 000
26 296
22 945
39 350

38.5
29.8
54.6
19.8
27.4
49.4
39.8
15.2
15.8
16.4

Source: UNCTAD,World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linakages, table III.1, p. 90.
a TNI is the abbreviation for ‘transnationality index’. The transnationality index is calculated as the average of three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and foreign
b
Industry classification for companies follows the United States Standard Industrial Classification as used by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
c
Foreign assets, sales and employment are outside Europe.
Data on foreign assets, foreign sales and foreign employment were not made available for the purpose of this study. In case of non-availability, they are estimated using secondary
.. sources of information or on the basis of the ratios of foreign to total assets, foreign to total sales and foreign to total employment.
Note: The list includes non-financial TNCs only. In some companies, foreign investors may hold a minority share of more than 10 per cent.
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Table 5.. The largest 10 non-financial TNCs based in Central and Eastern Europe, a ranked by foreign assets, 1999
(Millions of dollars and number of employees)
Ranking by
Foreign
assets

Assets

Sales

Transnationality

index

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

a
b
c
d
e

15
1
23
12
6
11
8
7
10
2

b

Total

Assets
Foreign

Employment

Corporation

Country

Industry

Foreign

Total

Foreign

Total

Lukoil Oil Co.
Latvian Shipping Co.
Hrvatska Elektroprivreda d.d.
c
Podravka Group
Primorsk Shipping Co.
Gorenje Group
Far Eastern Shipping Co.
Pliva Group
TVK Ltd.
c
Motokov a.s.

Russian Federation
Latvia
Croatia
Croatia
Russian Federation
Slovenia
Russian Federation
Croatia
Hungary
Czech Republic

Petroleum & natural gas
Transportation
Energy
Food & beverages/ pharmaceuticals
Transportation
Domestic appliances
Transportation
Pharmaceuticals
Chemicals
Trade

3 236.0 8 422.0 4 642.0 10 903.0
459.0
470.0
191.0
191.0
296.0 2 524.0
10.0
780.0
285.9
477.1
119.4
390.2
256.4
444.1
85.3
116.5
236.3
618.1
593.3 1 120.6
236.0
585.0
134.0
183.0
181.8
915.9
384.7
587.6
175.4
553.2
248.9
394.3
163.6
262.5
260.2
349.1

10 000
1 124
..
501
1 308
590
263
2 645
927
576

120 000
1 748
15 877
6 898
2 777
6 691
8 873
7 857
5 225
1 000

d

Transnationality

Sales
index b

Source : UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages , table III.16, p. 115.
Based on survey responses.
The index of transnationality is calculated as the average of three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to total sales and foreign employment to total employment.
1998 data.
Including export sales by parent firm.
Unweighted average.
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29.8
87.3
4.3
32.6
59.4
33.3
38.8
39.7
37.5
64.8

continents (as in semiconductors). Within such complex systems, the functions transferred to different
locations vary greatly. Less industrialized locations are assigned simpler tasks like assembly and packaging,
while more skill- and technology-intensive functions are allocated to industrially more advanced locations.
Figure 1. The distribution of foreign affiliates in the biotechnology industry, 1999a

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linakages, figure II.18, p. 69.
a
On the basis of 169 majority-owned foreign affiliates identified.

Figure 2. The distribution of foreign affiliates in food and beverage industry, 1999a

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linakages, figure II.22, p. 69.
a
On the basis of 2,245 majority-owned foreign affiliates identified.
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…with countries varying greatly in terms of their success in attracting FDI, as revealed in the new
Inward FDI Index.
The concentration of FDI reflects the concentration of economic activity more generally. Thus,
exports, domestic investment and technology payments are also highly concentrated. Richer and more
competitive economies naturally receive and send more international direct investment than other economies.
To gauge the underlying attractiveness of a country for international investors, it is useful to take its
relative economic size and strength into account. The Inward FDI Index captures the ability of countries to
attract FDI after taking into account their size and competitiveness. The Index is the average of three ratios,
showing each country’s share in world FDI relative to its shares in GDP, employment and exports. An index
value of “one” would therefore mean that a country’s share in world FDI matches its economic position in
terms of these three indicators.
The ranking of 112 countries in 1988-1990 and 137 in 1998-2000 shows a large dispersion of index
values. For 1998-2000, the value of the Index ranges from 17.3 for the leading economy, Belgium and
Luxembourg, to -0.8 for Yemen. Moreover, the rankings have changed significantly over time. Singapore has
slipped from first position at the end of the 1980s to thirteenth position a decade later. The fall in its index value
reflects a slower growth of FDI (by about a half) than in its GDP and exports which more than doubled
between the two periods. The position of Sweden has improved considerably (moving from the twenty-ninth
spot to the fourth), partly reflecting a deliberate change in policy during the 1990s in favour of greater openness
towards inward FDI.
In 1998-2000, there were five countries with an Inward FDI Index value of one: Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Hungary, Malaysia and Slovakia. There were 53 countries with a value higher than one, and 79 with
values lower than one. The last group, which “under-performs” in terms of attracting FDI, includes advanced
economies like Japan, Italy and Greece, newly industrializing economies like the Republic of Korea, Taiwan
Province of China and Turkey, oil rich economies like Saudi Arabia and a number of low income countries. FDI
recipients with high values of the Index include the majority of the developed countries, Hong Kong (China),
Singapore and some Central and Eastern European countries.
In both periods, the Index value for developed countries is about twice the world average, while those
for developing countries and economies in transition are below the world average (table 6). The differences
between the three groups of countries reflect mainly the influence of the employment variable: the developed
and developing country groups have FDI shares roughly in proportion to their GDP shares, but the former
receive far larger shares of world FDI than their shares in world employment, while developing countries and
economies in transition receive less. Within the developing world, the Inward FDI Index values for South
America and Central Asia exceeded unity in 1998-2000. In the other regions (and for these two regions in the
earlier period), the Index value was below one. South Asia, West Asia and North Africa show the lowest values;
the reasons for this may have more to do with political factors than economic ones. Sub-Saharan Africa
receives FDI in line with its GDP share, but very little in relation to its share in employment; over time its FDI
Index value has declined slightly. For the LDC group, the value of the FDI Index doubled between the two
periods, mostly due to increases in the FDI to exports and FDI to GDP ratios. In fact, in the second period, the
Index value for African LDCs exceeded one; it is now almost twice as high as that for sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole. The index value for other LDCs has declined over the decade.
The Index suggests that Africa receives less FDI flows in comparison with the region’s relative
economic size. The underlying economic reality is that sub-Saharan Africa has lost share in both world FDI
inflows and other economic aggregates; African LDCs, however, have maintained their share of FDI but have
fallen further behind in other economic aggregates.
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Table 6. The Inward FDI Index, by region, 1988-1990 and 1998-2000
1988-1990

1998-2000

FDI share/ FDI share/ FDI share/
Region
Worlda
Developed economies
Western Europe
European Union
Other Western Europe
North America
Other developed economies
Developing economies
Africa
North Africa
Other Africa
Latin America and the Caribbean
South America
Other Latin America and the Caribbean
Asia and the Pacific
Asia
West Asia
Central Asia
South, East and South-East Asia
South Asia
Pacific
Developing Europe
Central and Eastern Europe

GDP
share a

employment
share b

export
share c

FDI

FDI share/ FDI share/ FDI share/

inward
index

GDP
share a

employment
share b

export
share c

FDI
inward
index

1.0
1.0
1.3
1.3
1.1
1.1
0.3
1.0
1.0
0.8
1.2
0.8
0.7
1.2
1.1
1.1
0.3
..
1.3
0.1
4.5
2.2
0.2

1.0
4.0
4.9
4.8
5.7
4.7
1.1
0.2
0.2
0.4
0.2
0.6
0.5
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.2
..
0.2
1.6
3.4
0.1

1.0
1.1
0.9
1.0
0.6
2.0
0.5
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.8
1.0
1.0
1.1
0.6
0.6
0.2
..
0.7
0.3
1.9
0.5
0.2

1.0
2.0
2.4
2.4
2.5
2.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.7
1.0
0.6
0.6
0.2
..
0.7
0.1
2.7
2.1
0.1

1.0
1.0
1.6
1.6
1.1
0.9
0.1
1.0
0.7
0.4
1.0
1.1
1.2
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.2
1.7
1.1
0.2
1.2
1.2
0.9

1.0
4.4
6.3
6.4
5.5
4.4
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.1
1.0
1.1
0.7
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
1.5
0.4

1.0
1.1
1.1
1.1
0.6
1.6
0.2
0.7
0.6
0.4
0.7
1.6
2.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.1
1.3
0.6
0.3
0.5
0.6
0.6

1.0
2.2
3.0
3.0
2.4
2.3
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.3
0.6
1.2
1.6
0.7
0.6
0.6
0.2
1.1
0.6
0.2
0.7
1.1
0.6

0.3
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.1
..
0.1
..

0.1
..
..

0.6
0.6
0.4
0.5
0.5
..
0.5
..

0.3
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
..
0.2
..

0.6
1.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
-1.3
0.2
..

0.1
0.1
-0.2
..

1.0
1.7
0.2
0.2
0.2
-0.9
0.5
..

0.6
1.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
-0.8
0.2
..

Memorandum: least developed countries d
LDCs: total
African LDCs
Latin America and the Caribbean LDCs
Asian and Pacific LDCs
Asian LDCs
West Asian LDCs
South and South-East Asian LDCs
Pacific LDCs

Source : UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages, table I.5, p. 43.
a

The ratio of the region’s share of world FDI inflows to the region’s share of world GDP.

LABSTA database and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2001.
c
The ratio of the region’s share of world FDI inflows to the region’s share of world exports of foods and non-factor services.
d

LDCs as defined by the United Nations.

Note : The Indexes for some regions are based o n incomplete coverage o f countries in the region, due to lack o f data o n one o r
more variables. Also, the Indexes for Central Asia, Developing Europe and Central and Eastern Europe are not strictly comparable
between the two periods because the number o f countries included in each differed substantially between the two periods. The
increase in the number o f countries covered by the Index for developing economies in the second period (from 86 to 100) can cause a
moderate upward bias in that grouping's Index in the second period.

Interpreting the Inward FDI Index calls for care and the use of evidence on other economic and policy
variables. Nonetheless, it can provide a starting point for benchmarking how countries succeed in attracting
FDI. Many of the countries at the top of the ranking (with an index value far exceeding unity) are strong
economies that are leveraging their economic strength through policies to attract more than their “normal” share
of FDI. There are also, however, a few countries with weak economies but strong natural resource
endowments that occupy places at the top. A number of countries at the bottom are weak economies in which
the influence of other economic factors and policies apparently pulls inward FDI below levels that could be
expected on the basis of the elements of economic strength covered by the Index. There are others at the
bottom, (such as Japan and the Republic of Korea), however, that have strong economic positions overall but
have chosen to restrict FDI (at least until fairly recently).
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The expansion of international production is taking place in a new international setting...
The rapidly changing international setting is changing the drivers of FDI. While the main traditional
factors driving FDI location - large markets, the possession of natural resources and access to low-cost
unskilled or semi-skilled labour - remain relevant, they are diminishing in importance, particularly for the most
dynamic industries and functions. As trade barriers come down and regional links grow, the significance of
many national markets also diminishes. Primary industries account for a shrinking share of industrial activity,
and natural resources per se play a smaller role in attracting FDI for many countries. The role of cheap “raw”
labour is similar: even labour-intensive activities often need to be combined with new technologies and advanced
skills. The location of TNC activity instead increasingly reflects three developments: policy liberalization,
technical progress and evolving corporate strategies.
Changes in the international policy environment have a strong impact on locational decisions. Trade and
investment liberalization allows TNCs to specialize more and to search for competitive locations. TNCs have
greater freedom to choose locations and the functions they transfer. Between 1991 and 2000, a total of 1,185
regulatory changes were introduced in national FDI regimes, of which 1,121 (95 per cent) were in the direction
of creating a more favourable environment for FDI (table 7). During 2000 alone, 69 countries made 150
regulatory changes, of which 147 (98 per cent) were more favourable to foreign investors.
Technical progress affects the geography of FDI in many ways. Rapid innovation provides the
advantages that propel firms into international production. Thus, innovation-intensive industries tend to be
increasingly transnational, and TNCs have to be more innovative to maintain their competitiveness. Innovation
also leads to changes in the structure of trade and production, with R&D-intensive activities growing faster than
less technology-intensive activities. The increased technology intensity of products reduces the importance of
primary and simple low-technology activities in FDI, while raising that of skill-intensive activities. New
information and communication technologies intensify competition while allowing firms to manage widely
dispersed international operations more efficiently. High-technology activities previously out of reach of
developing countries can now be placed there because labour-intensive processes within those activities can be
economically separated and managed over long distances.
Table 7. National regulatory changes, 1991-2000
Item
Number of countries that
introduced changes in their
investment regimes
Number of regulatory changes
of which:
a
More favourable to FDI
b
Less favourable to FDI

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

35
82

43
79

57
102

49
110

64
112

65
114

76
151

60
145

63
140

69
150

80
2

79
-

101
1

108
2

106
6

98
16

135
16

136
9

131
9

147
3

S o u r c e : U N C T A D , W o r l d I n v e s t m e n t R e p o r t 2 0 0 1 : P r o m o t i n g L i n k a g e s , box table I.1.1, p. 6.
a I n c l u d i n g liberalizing c h a n g e s o r c h a n g e s a i m e d a t s t r e n g t h e n i n g m a r k e t f u n c t i o n i n g , a s w e l l a s i n c r e a s e d
incentives.
b Including changes aimed at increasing control as well as reducing incentives.

Many activities in integrated production systems are technology-intensive and dynamic; their location in
developing countries can rapidly transform the FDI and competitive landscape there. Moreover, the
pervasiveness of technical change means that all TNC activities have to use new technologies effectively.
Location decisions have to be based on the ability of host countries to provide the complementary skills,
infrastructure, suppliers and institutions to operate technologies efficiently and flexibly. Technical progress,
thus, forces firms involved in international production to differentiate increasingly between the “haves” and
“have-nots” in new FDI-complementing factors when deciding where to undertake different activities.
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Managerial and organizational factors strengthen the new locational determinants of FDI. A greater
focus on core competencies, with flatter hierarchies and stronger emphasis on networking, steers investments
towards locations with advanced factors and institutions, and, where relevant, distinct industrial clusters. New
organizational methods (aided by new technologies) allow a more efficient management of global operations,
encouraging a greater relocation of functions. Intense competition forces firms to specialize in their core
business, inducing TNCs to forge external links at various points along the value chain (from design and
innovation to marketing and servicing) and allow other firms (including TNCs) to undertake different functions.
Hence, the changing geography of international production reflects the dynamic interaction of many
economic, organizational and policy factors. While many of these factors have long been relevant, their
combination today represents new forces influencing TNC location decisions. To cope successfully with
globalization and use FDI to their advantage, developing countries must understand these forces. They set the
parameters within which policy makers have to act, to attract FDI and to extract the greatest benefits in terms
of technology, skills and market access, striking backward linkages and leveraging foreign assets to reach
competitive positions in global markets.
...and leads to a concentration at the sub-national level as well...
The growing spread and mobility of TNCs are making local conditions more, not less, important. The
increased freedom for factors and functions to move does not mean that international production spreads
equally to all locations. Mobile factors only go and “stick” in places where efficient complementary factors
exist. Thus, FDI tends to be fairly concentrated geographically within countries, responding to the
agglomeration economies that also influence domestic firms. These economies relate to proximity to markets
and factors of production, and the availability of specialized skills, innovatory capabilities, suppliers and
institutions. Intensifying competition forces firms to specialize more in their core competencies and rely more
heavily on links with external partners (suppliers, buyers or even competitors) than in the past. These
networking possibilities often induce TNCs to set up operations in close proximity to (competent) clusters of
related firms.
Industrial clusters are playing an increasing role in economic activity, particularly in technology
intensive activity. “Clusters” are concentrations of firms in one or a few industries, benefiting from synergies
created by a dense network of competitors, buyers and suppliers. Clusters comprise demanding buyers,
specialized suppliers, sophisticated human resources, finance and well-developed support institutions. Such
concentrations of resources and capabilities can attract “efficiency-seeking” FDI (and more and more FDI is of
this type). It also helps to attract “asset-seeking” FDI to the more advanced host countries. In their inexorable
search for new competitive advantages, TNCs seek “created assets” such as technology and skilled labour
across the globe. Clusters of innovative activity (as in Silicon Valley in California, Silicon Fen in Cambridge
(United Kingdom), Wireless Valley in Stockholm or Zhong Guancum, a suburb of Beijing) have a distinct
advantage in attracting such (high value) FDI.
These shifts in location factors pose important policy challenges for developing countries. Many
countries, in particular the poorer and least industrialized ones, risk becoming even more marginal to the
dynamics of international production because they cannot meet the new requirements for attracting high quality
FDI. Simply opening an economy is no longer enough. There is a need to develop attractive configurations of
locational advantages.
Different configurations of advantages attract different corporate functions and industries. In some
high-technology industries like electronics, it may be possible to attract final-stage assembly on the basis of
cost-efficient semi-skilled labour and efficient export-processing facilities. In other activities, production
facilities may require well-developed local supply chains, a pool of skilled labour, close interaction with other
firms and knowledge-producing institutions in close proximity. Some back-office activities may require
specialized skills (e.g. in accounting). High value functions like R&D or regional headquarters are particularly
demanding of advanced skills and institutions.
Investors - domestic and foreign alike - seek to take advantage of dynamic clusters. In joining a cluster,
they often add to its strength and dynamism. This, in turn, tends to attract new skills and capital, adding further
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to the dynamism of the location. Where agglomeration economies are significant, the rest of the country might
be of little relevance to the locational decisions of firms. Hence, attracting FDI in these activities depends
increasingly on the ability to provide efficient clusters. An international bank’s location choice is not so much a
choice between the United Kingdom and Germany as between London and Frankfurt.
Just like competitive firms differentiate themselves from their rivals by developing clearly identifiable
products with recognizable brand names, some countries, too, can, over time, identify and develop their distinct
“investment products”, and market them to foreign investors. For example, Bangalore in India has become a
“brand name” for the development of software, with its pool of highly skilled engineers and competitive
software companies. Singapore and Hong Kong (China) enjoy a similar status in the area of financial services
and regional headquarters in Asia.
…which calls for a new generation of investment promotion policies.
Using and strengthening clusters to attract FDI calls for new approaches, going beyond the first and
second generations of investment promotion policies. In the first generation of investment promotion policies,
many countries adopt market friendly policies. They liberalize their FDI regimes by reducing barriers to inward
FDI, strengthening standards of treatment for foreign investors and giving a greater role to market forces in
resource allocation. Virtually all countries - to varying degrees - have undertaken steps in this direction. Some
countries, can go a long way in attracting FDI with these steps, if the basic economic determinants for
obtaining FDI are right. In the second generation of investment promotion policies, governments go a step
further and actively seek to attract FDI by “marketing” their countries. This approach leads to the setting up of
national investment promotion agencies. The World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies, established
in 1995, now has over 100 members. Again, of course, the success of proactive efforts depends, in the end, on
the quality of the basic economic factors in a host country.
The third generation of investment promotion policies takes the enabling framework for FDI and a
proactive approach towards attracting FDI as a starting point. It then proceeds to target foreign investors at the
level of industries and firms to meet their specific locational needs at the activity and cluster level, in light of a
country’s developmental priorities. Such a strategy, in turn, is greatly helped if a country can nurture specific
clusters that build on the country’s competitive advantages, capitalizing on the natural inclination of firms to
agglomerate and that eventually acquire a brand name. A critical element of such investment promotion is to
improve - and market - particular locations to potential investors in specific activities. Of course, a country’s
general economic, political and regulatory features also matter, because they affect the efficiency of the clusters
within it. But the key to success of such new investment promotion strategies is that they actually address one
of the basic economic FDI determinants while understanding the changing location strategies of TNCs.
However, such a targeted approach, especially the development of locational “brand names”, is difficult
and takes time. It requires fairly sophisticated institutional capacities. Third generation promotion is,
nevertheless, growing in practice, as witnessed by the proliferation of sub-national agencies (of which a
minimum of 240 exist today) and even municipal investment promotion agencies.
This gives rise to another challenge: the need to coordinate policies across various administrative levels
in a country. If that is not done, there is a risk that competition among regions within a country leads to “fiscal
wars” and results in waste as far as the welfare of the country as a whole is concerned. It also raises the risk
that promotion agencies, if they are unable to coordinate other policy-making bodies in the country, will be
unable to deliver on their promises to investors.
Regardless of the level at which FDI is promoted - and regardless of the precise mix of the three basic
investment strategies that is being pursued - the competitiveness of the domestic enterprise sector and a pool of
skilled people are the key to the “product”. Strong local firms attract FDI; the entry of foreign affiliates, in turn,
feeds into the competitiveness and dynamism of the domestic enterprise sector. The strongest channel for
diffusing skills, knowledge and technology from foreign affiliates is the linkages they strike with local firms and
institutions. Such linkages can contribute to the growth of a vibrant domestic enterprise sector, the bedrock of
economic development. For developing countries, the formation of backward linkages with foreign affiliates
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therefore assumes particular importance. The challenge then is how to promote backward linkages - regardless
of the type of investment promotion policy a country pursues. This is the topic of Part Two of WIR01.
PROMOTING BACKWARD LINKAGES
Backward linkages from foreign affiliates to domestic firms can enhance the benefits from FDI.
Part One of WIR01 mapped the locational pattern of the extent to which countries attract FDI. A key
factor determining the benefits host countries can derive from FDI are the linkages that foreign affiliates strike
with domestically owned firms. Backward linkages from foreign affiliates to domestic firms are important
channels through which intangible and tangible assets can be passed on from the former to the latter. They can
contribute to the upgrading of domestic enterprises and embed foreign affiliates more firmly in host economies.
Given the role that backward linkages can play in these respects, WIR01 analyses how host country
governments can best promote efficient backward linkages by foreign affiliates. The approach is pragmatic. It
draws on practical experience as to what firms have done to forge linkages, and the measures that governments
have adopted to encourage linkages and their deepening. An underlying assumption is that, whatever the current
level of backward linkages, linkages can be increased or deepened further, with a view towards strengthening
the capabilities and competitiveness of domestic firms.
Linkages offer benefits to foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers, as well as to the economy in which
they are forged as a whole. For foreign affiliates, local procurement can lower production costs in host
economies with lower costs and allow greater specialization and flexibility, with better adaptation of
technologies and products to local conditions. The presence of technologically advanced suppliers can provide
affiliates with access to external technological and skill resources, feeding into their own innovative efforts. The
direct effect of linkages on domestic suppliers is generally a rise in their output and employment. Linkages can
also transmit knowledge and skills between the linked firms. A dense network of linkages can promote
production efficiency, productivity growth, technological and managerial capabilities and market diversification
for the firms involved. Finally, for a host economy as a whole, linkages can stimulate economic activity and,
where local inputs substitute for imported ones, benefit the balance of payments. The strengthening of suppliers
can in turn lead to spillovers to the rest of the host economy and contribute to a vibrant enterprise sector.
Where, as in developed countries, both buyers and suppliers are technologically strong and capable,
knowledge flows run in both directions with a focus mainly on new technologies, products and organizational
methods. Where, as in most developing countries, suppliers are relatively weak, the flows are likely to be more
one-sided, from foreign affiliates (buyers) to domestic firms. They can also be expected to contain more basic
technological and managerial knowledge, in that suppliers are likely to lag further behind international best
practice frontiers; for this reason, they can be particularly important.
Of course, not all linkages are equally beneficial for host economies. For example, in highly protected
regimes, foreign affiliates may strike considerable linkages without much incentive to invest in the upgrading of
suppliers’ technological capabilities. Instead, such linkages may foster a supplier base that is unable to survive
international competition. Linkages developed in competitive environments and accompanied by efforts to
enhance suppliers’ capabilities are likely to be technologically more beneficial and dynamic. The objective is not
to promote linkages for their own sake, but to do so where they are beneficial to the host economy.
The extent to which domestic firms benefit from linkages with foreign affiliates also depends on the
nature of their relationship. The intensity of the interaction between buyers and suppliers is affected by the
bargaining position of the two parties. A supplier of relatively simple, standardized, low-technology products
and services is typically in a weak bargaining position vis-à-vis its buyer. Such suppliers may be highly
vulnerable to market fluctuations, and their linkages with foreign affiliates are unlikely to involve much exchange
of information and knowledge. Foreign affiliates only invest resources in building local capabilities when they
expect such an effort to yield a positive return.
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TNCs have a self-interest in forging links with domestic suppliers,…
Organizational changes are making supply chain management more critical to the competitiveness of
firms, including TNCs. On average, a manufacturing firm spends more than half its revenues on purchased
inputs. In some industries, such as electronics and automotive, the proportion is even higher. Some firms are
contracting out the entire manufacturing process to independent “contract manufacturers”, keeping only such
functions as R&D, design and marketing. In these cases, supply chain management obviously becomes even
more important.
A foreign affiliate - like any other firm - has three options for obtaining inputs in a host country: import
them; produce them locally in-house; or procure them from a local (foreign- or domestically owned) supplier.
The extent to which foreign affiliates forge linkages with domestic suppliers is determined by the balance of
costs and benefits, as well as differences in firm-level perceptions and strategies. While the costs and benefits
reflect a large number of industry-specific factors, the most important one concerns the local availability of
qualified suppliers. Foreign affiliates producing primarily for the domestic market generally procure a larger
share of inputs locally than export-oriented ones or those that are part of integrated international production
systems. In the latter case, cost and quality considerations are particularly stringent, and affiliates tend to be
guided by corporate global sourcing strategies. The lack of efficient domestic suppliers is often the key obstacle
to the creation of local linkages. In many demanding activities, TNCs therefore actively encourage foreign
suppliers to establish local facilities or prefer to produce in-house.
Many TNCs have supplier development programmes in host developing countries. Efforts can include
finding suppliers and ensuring efficient supply through technology transfer, training, information sharing and the
provision of finance. The objective is usually to expand the number of efficient suppliers, and/or to help existing
suppliers improve their capabilities in one or several areas. However, supplier development efforts are typically
not extended to all suppliers. Foreign affiliates tend to focus on a limited number of suppliers providing the
strategically most important inputs. Where supplier development is undertaken, however, TNCs often offer
considerable support to suppliers by transferring technology, training suppliers’ staff, providing business-related
information and lending financial support. The intensity of knowledge and information exchange in buyersupplier relationships tends to increase with the level of economic development of host countries, particularly in
complex activities, and where technological and managerial gaps with suppliers are not too wide.
…but governments can play an important role in promoting linkages...
Although foreign affiliates have an interest in creating and strengthening local linkages, their willingness
to do so can be influenced by government policies addressing different market failures at different levels in the
linkage formation process. For example, TNCs may be unaware of the availability of viable suppliers, or they
may find it too costly to use them as sources of inputs. In developing countries, policies may be required to
compensate for weak financial markets or weak institutions like vocational schools, training institutes,
technology support centres, R&D and testing laboratories and the like. Well-designed government intervention
can raise the benefits and reduce the costs of using domestic suppliers.
The role of policy is most significant where there is an “information gap” on the part of both buyers
and suppliers about linkage opportunities, a “capability gap” between the requirements of buyers and the supply
capacity of suppliers and where the costs and risks for setting up linkages or deepening them can be reduced.
The linkage formation process is obviously affected by a host country’s overall policy environment, its
economic and institutional framework, the availability of human resources, the quality of infrastructure and
political and macroeconomic stability. But the most important host country factor is the availability, costs and
quality of domestic suppliers. Indeed, in addition to being a key determinant for the formation of efficient
linkages, the technological and managerial capabilities of domestic firms also determine to a large extent the
ability of a host economy to absorb and benefit from the knowledge that linkages can transfer. Weak capabilities
of domestic firms increase the chances that foreign affiliates source the most sophisticated and complex parts
and components either internally or from a preferred (foreign-owned) supplier within or outside a host country.
For example, domestic firms in Taiwan Province of China and Singapore supply complex inputs to foreign
affiliates, but far fewer do so in Malaysia, Thailand or Mexico.
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The international environment is evolving, as a result of globalization and liberalization, as well as
changes in the international policy framework, including WTO agreements and other international arrangements.
Some policy instruments traditionally used to foster linkages are now considered less relevant or are subject to
new multilateral rules, such as the WTO Agreement on Trade-related Investment Measures (TRIMs) or the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. For example, local content requirements have been
phased out by most countries. At the same time, FDI and trade liberalization, as well as more intense
competition for FDI, have reduced the reliance on other investment performance requirements.
Well-targeted incentives to support the creation and deepening of linkages can have a positive impact on
linkages. Thought should be given to render this category of development-related subsidies non-actionable (i.e.
not open to challenge) under WTO rules. On the other hand, preferential trade arrangements – with rules of
origin based on the level of domestic value added or local content – can have important effects on FDI and
linkage creation by TNCs in preference-receiving countries. In general, these effects are the more significant,
the higher the preferential margin associated with rules of origin and the lower the related administrative costs.
Linkage effects of rules of origin, however, also depend on local supply capacity.
This new international setting has, thus, changed the scope for national policy options. There is,
however, flexibility within the existing international policy framework, e.g. in the form of extension of transition
arrangements and differential treatment of countries at different levels of development. While some agreements
are subject to further review, the challenge for policy makers is, therefore, to make use of the options allowed
within the current framework, as well as other policy measures that are not subject to multilateral rules to
integrate FDI more deeply into their national economies and, in particular, benefit from backward linkages.
In this new policy environment, active policy approaches that work with the market are at a premium.
Whereas there is no universally established best practice in linkage promotion policy, important lessons can be
drawn from past experience. Linkage promotion policies, like other development policies, are often highly
context specific and need to be adapted to the specific circumstances prevailing in each host country (figure 3).
They need to be an integral part of broader development strategies, and their success often depends on factors
that may not appear in a narrow assessment of linkages policies. Much also depends on how policies are
designed, coordinated and implemented in practice.
One approach involves encouraging linkages through various measures to bring domestic suppliers and
foreign affiliates together and to strengthen their linkages in the key areas of information, technology, training
and finance. This is a broad approach - it basically improves the enabling framework for linkages formation. A
review of the experience of host countries yields a long menu of specific measures that can be taken in this
respect. Such measures can include, for example, the provision of information and matchmaking to help
domestic firms link up with foreign affiliates; encouraging foreign affiliates to participate in programmes aimed
at the upgrading of domestic suppliers’ technological capabilities; promoting the establishment of supplier
associations or clubs; the joint provision of services (especially training); and various schemes to enhance
domestic suppliers’ access to finance.
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Figure 3. Policy focus for the promotion of backward linkages

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linakages, figure V.1, p. 164.

…perhaps best in the framework of a special linkage promotion programme.
Another approach goes further in that it involves the establishment of a specific linkage promotion
programme combining a number of the measures just mentioned. This is a proactive approach which is
typically focused on a selected number of industries and firms, with a view towards increasing and deepening
linkages between foreign affiliates and domestic firms. As with other policies that span a range of productive
factors, activities and enterprises, it is advisable for policy makers that choose this approach to “start small”
(perhaps with a pilot scheme) and to build policy monitoring, flexibility and learning into the programme. The
need for starting small is all the greater when resources are scarce. Moreover, it is essential for any programme
to seek close collaboration with the private sector, both foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers, in design and
implementation.
Some countries have in fact set up specific linkage programmes involving a combination of different
policy measures, and targeting selected industries and firms. Such programmes have been put in place primarily
by countries with a large foreign presence and with a (relatively) well-developed base of domestic enterprises.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Ireland, Malaysia, Mexico, Singapore, Thailand and the United Kingdom have all
made special efforts of this kind. Some of the programmes are organized at the national level while others have
been implemented as regional or local initiatives. Three elements are common to them: the provision of market
and business information; matchmaking; and managerial or technical assistance, training and, occasionally,
financial support or incentives. Some programmes have also included FDI promotion activities, to attract
foreign investors in targeted industries. In each case, sustainable linkages will only be created if both foreign
affiliates and domestic firms can benefit from them.
The general features of a special Linkages Promotion Programme are set out below. Such a programme
should be seen more as a set of building blocks that countries might “mix and match” according to their specific
circumstances, rather than a ready-made prescription that all countries can apply. Clearly, the choice of
measures and the way they are combined must reflect the level of development, policy capabilities, resources
and objectives of each country. Even countries at similar levels of development may choose different
configurations of policy according to their enterprise and institutional capabilities.
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The starting point for an effective linkage programme is a clear vision of how FDI fits into the overall
development strategy and, more specifically, a strategy to build production capacity. The vision has to be based
on a clear understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the economy and of the challenges facing it in a
globalizing world. A linkage programme should, in particular, address the competitive needs of domestic
enterprises and the implications these have for policies, private and public support institutions and support
measures (including skills- and technology-upgrading).
1. Setting the policy objectives of a linkage programme
Linkage programmes are at the intersection of two subsets of programmes and policies: those geared
towards enterprise development (especially SME development) and those related to FDI promotion. The former
are desirable in and by themselves, as a vibrant enterprise sector is the bedrock of economic growth and
development; in the context of the promotion of linkages, the capabilities of local firms are the single most
important determinant of success. FDI promotion, in turn, increasingly focuses not only on the quantity of FDI
a country attracts, but also on it quality, including linkage opportunities.
Linkage programmes can have two broad objectives: to increase domestic sourcing by foreign affiliates
(i.e. create new backward linkages) and to deepen and upgrade existing linkages - both with the ultimate aim of
upgrading the capacities of local suppliers to produce higher value-added goods in a competitive environment.
These objectives are interdependent: deepening may spin off new linkages, and spreading linkages may change
their quality and depth.
A government’s objectives should be shared with all principal stakeholders, as their active participation
is needed for the success of any programme. Active dialogue and consultations are advisable right from the very
beginning. This requires first and foremost:
•

Initiating a public -private sector dialogue (perhaps in a “Linkage Forum”) with stakeholders,
including foreign affiliates (and especially their procurement officers), supplier industry
associations, chambers of commerce, banks, service providers, trade unions and government
agencies (such as investment promotion agencies, development corporations, industrial zone
authorities, industry development agencies).

•

Disseminating “best practice” experiences based on companies’ programmes and actions and
experiences of government programmes and measures in other countries.

2. Identifying the targets of the programme
Governments, in cooperation with private sector institutions, need to define the targets of a programme
in terms of the industries and, within them, the foreign affiliates and domestic suppliers to be involved.
•
-

-

Industries can be selected according to:
the sectoral development priorities of a country, taking into account the extent of the presence of
foreign affiliates and capable domestic firms;
the degree of match between local capabilities and the input requirements of foreign affiliates;
the nature of international production systems within the industry selected, which partly
determines the degree of autonomy of foreign affiliates with respect to local sourcing (foreign
affiliates that are part of integrated international production systems are likely to be more
dependent on global corporate sourcing policies);
the technology content of the activity and the scope for moving up the value-added chain.

Such an analysis is essential for any linkage strategy - without it, a government cannot decide how to
allocate scarce resources. It also has to take into account trends in the growth and spread of
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international production networks and their implications for domestic producers, drawing, among others,
on continuous dialogue with key stakeholders.
•

Foreign affiliates can be selected according to their willingness and potential to establish beneficial
linkages. Beyond that - and as part of their FDI promotion - governments can target TNCs that are
particularly interested in developing strong supply links with domestic enterprises. The linkage
programme may even support local managers of foreign affiliates in lobbying their head offices to allow
greater autonomy in sourcing. In-depth consultations with foreign affiliates can then identify their
specific linkage needs.

•

Suppliers can be selected on the basis of their commitment and capabilities (or potential capabilities) to
meet the needs of foreign affiliates. “Commitment” can be tested through certain self-improvement
requirements, with some external guidance and minimal support during the initial stage of selection.
Other criteria that can be used involve technological benchmarking and skills audits. Specific criteria that
have been used include the size of the firm, production capabilities, ISO certification and age. However,
one of the most important elements to take into account is the commitment of key managers (and
especially the chief executive officer) to the idea of continuous improvement and their willingness to
upgrade their operations to meet international standards required for successful linkages. The active
cooperation of chambers of commerce, business associations, support centres, service providers and
other private sector institutions is very important here, as is the cooperation of SME development
programmes, be they local or international. (UNCTAD’s EMPRETEC programme is an example of the
latter.) “Linkage Workshops” for representatives of foreign affiliates and local enterprises could provide
the mechanism through which eventual programme participants can be narrowed down. Subsequent
“Business Clinics” for Linkage Workshop participants could then allow for one-to-one consultations for
pairs of linkage partners. Firms prepared to go further could thus undertake operational and management
audits to determine the strengths and weaknesses of domestic partners.
3. Identifying specific measures to be adopted

Governments need to be aware of actions already taken by foreign affiliates and domestic firms (table
8). Some of these may need to be encouraged and supported. Governments can also act as facilitators and
catalysts and ensure that private institutions have the incentives and resources needed. They can be particularly
proactive in the following key areas of linkage formation: information and matchmaking; technology upgrading;
training; access to finance (table 9). The range of measures that can be taken in each of these areas is wide.
Their principal purpose is to encourage and support foreign affiliates and domestic firms to forge and deepen
linkages. They are outlined - individually and as contained in programmes - in the main body of WIR01. They
constitute a menu from which governments can mix and match. Specific choices depend on the results of
earlier consultations with existing support institutions and relevant programmes in the public and private sectors,
as well as with key stakeholders on the specific needs of an industry or set of firms. The results of the Linkage
Forums, Linkage Workshops and Business Clinics mentioned earlier and the identification of promising domestic
firms are also of help here. Governments could also encourage participating foreign affiliates to agree to a
coaching and mentoring arrangement with promising local firms.
These measures can be underpinned by efforts to strengthen the negotiating position of local firms visà-vis foreign affiliates; for instance, by guidelines or making model contracts available. Special informal
mechanisms can also help resolve problems and disputes and contribute to more lasting linkage relationships.
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Table 8. Measures by foreign affiliates to create and deepen linkages

Creation of new
linkages
• Making public
announcements
about the need for
suppliers and the
requirements that
firms must meet on
cost and quality.
• Supplier visits and
quality audits.

Transferring of Technology
Product technology:
• Provision of proprietary product know-how.
• Transfer of product designs and technology specifications.
• Technical consultations with suppliers to help them master new
technologies.
• Feedback on product performance to help suppliers improve
performance.
• Collaboration in R&D.
Process technology:
• Provision of machinery and equipment to suppliers.
• Technical support on production planning, quality management, inspection
and testing.
• Visits to the suppliers facilities to advise on lay -outs, operations and
quality.
• Formation of “cooperation clubs” to interact with suppliers on technical
issues.
• Assistance to employees to set up their own firms.

Providing training

Sharing information

• Training courses in
affiliates for suppliers’
personnel .
• Offering access to
internal training
programme in affiliates or
abroad.
• Sending teams of experts
to suppliers to provide inplant training.
• Promotion of cooperative
learning among suppliers.

• Informal exchanges of
information on business plans
and future requirements.
• Provision of annual purchase
orders.
• Provision of market
information.
• Encouraging suppliers to join
business associations.

Organisation and managerial know-how assistance:
• Assistance with inventory management (and the use of just-in-time and
other systems).
•
Assistance in implementing quality assurance systems.
•
Introduction to new practices such as network management or
financial, purchase and marketing techniques.
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages, table VI.2, p. 214.
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Giving financial support
• Providing special or favourable pricing for
suppliers’ products.
• Helping suppliers’ cash flow through
advance purchases and payments,
prompt settlements and provision of
foreign exchange.
• Long-term financial assistance through the
provision of capital; guarantees for bank
loans; the establishment of funds for
working capital or other suppliers needs;
infrastructure financing; sharing of the
costs of specific projects with suppliers;
and leasing.

Table 9. Government specific measures to create and strengthen linkages
Information and Matchmaking
Provision of information:
•
Handouts and brochures.
•
Constantly updated electronic databases.
Matchmaking:
•
Acting as honest broker in negotiations.
•
Supporting suppliers audits.
•
Providing advice on subcontracting deals.
•
Sponsoring fairs, exhibitions, mission and
conferences.
•
Organizing meetings, visits to plants.

•
•
•
•

Technology upgrading
Technology transfer as a performance
requirement.
Partnership with foreign affiliates.
Incentives for R&D coopeation.
Home-country incentives.

•
•
•
•

Training
Promoting suppliers associations.
Collaboration with the private sector
for one-stop service, including training.
Support to private sector training
programmes.
Collaboration with international
agencies.

Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2001: Promoting Linkages, table VI.1, p. 210.
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Financial assistance
• Legal protection against unfair contractual arrangements and other
unfair business practices.
• Encouraging of payment delays through legislation.
• Government guarantees to recovery of delayed payments
• Guaranteeing the recovery of delayed payments.
• Indirect financing to suppliers channelled through their buyers.
• Tax credits or tax reductions and other fiscal benefits to firms
providing long-term funds to suppliers.
• Co-financing development programmes with the private sector.
• Direct role in providing finance to local firms.
• Mandatory transfer of funds from foreign affiliates to local
suppliers.
Home country measures:
• Two-step loans.
• Using ODA.

The result should be a clear and feasible programme of action. Naturally, at each step of the
implementation of a programme, the government needs to have a clear idea about the costs involved and the
resources available.
4. Setting up an appropriate institutional and administrative framework to implement and
monitor the programme
Governments can choose from a number of options in designing the institutional framework for a
linkage programme:
Make the programme a distinct part of an existing body or even set up a special national-level linkage
programme under an independent body to act as the focal point for all relevant activities by different
departments and institutions.
Leave the design and implementation of the linkage programme to local authorities, with central advice,
encouragement and support from the central government. This approach might be preferable in large
countries or where resources for linkage programmes are limited, or where regions have distinct
combinations of locational advantages to offer.
Involve the private sector as the main executing agency for the linkage programme. Suppliers, affiliates
or their associations may set up such a body. The role of the government would be to act as catalyst
and fulfil regulatory and information functions.
The size of a programme depends on the objectives sought and the resources available. Some
programmes benefit from external funding through financial assistance provided by donor countries. In the
longer term, however, the financial sustainability of linkage programmes if directly run by governments,
requires sufficient government funding support. Moreover, cost sharing by participating firms (both buyers and
suppliers) is desirable, not only for funding purposes but also for assuring self-commitments of the participants.
This is feasible, especially when a programme has demonstrated its usefulness and is recognized for its
services. Needless to say, to create trust and credibility among enterprises, a programme must be staffed by
professionals with the appropriate private sector-related skills and background.
Linkage programmes can only work if they are networking effectively with efficient intermediate
institutions providing support in skill building, technology development, logistics and finance. These include
standards and metrology institutes, testing laboratories, R&D centres and other technical extension services,
productivity and manager training centres and financial institutions. These can be public or private. It is also
important that linkage programmes work closely with relevant private associations - chambers of commerce
and industry, manufacturers’ associations, investor associations and so on. Trade unions and various interest
groups are other important stakeholders.
Finally, it is important to have a monitoring system in place to evaluate the success of a programme.
Often, in a learning-by-doing process, a programme needs to be adjusted and refined as experiences accumulate
and situations change. The system could include benchmarks and surveys of users. Criteria could include the
following:
•

Outreach: the number of companies included in the programme over time.

•

Impact: the impact of the programme can be judged by such indicators as the number of
suppliers, linked up with foreign affiliates over time; the value of deals and changes in these over
time; the share of domestic suppliers in the procurement by foreign affiliates; the extent to which
R&D activities are being undertaken by domestic suppliers over time (including those resulting in
patents); changes in export volumes; the improvements in productivity or the value added at the
firm or industry level; and whether a local supplier establishes itself abroad.
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•

Cost effectiveness: the cost of the programme in light of the results achieved and the benefits
obtained as defined by the objectives laid out at the beginning of the programme.
*****

It is worth repeating that linkage programmes build on the mutual self-interests of foreign affiliates and
domestic firms. Linkages are a stepping stone towards strengthening the competitiveness of domestic firms,
giving them a foothold in international production networks and embedding foreign affiliates fully in host
economies. At the same time, linkage programmes should be seen as part of a broader set of FDI and SME
policies. As networks of viable suppliers often prosper in clusters of firms, attention needs to be given to the
development of such clusters, particularly for knowledge-intensive industries and activities. The third generation
of FDI promotion policy - targeting foreign investors at the level of industries and firms and using clusters to
attract FDI (and, in turn, strengthening clusters through it) - has a role to play here. In fact, the more linkage
promotion policies that go hand-in-hand with SME development and targeted FDI promotion policies, the more
they are likely to be successful.

Rubens Ricupero
Secretary-General of UNCTAD

Geneva, July 2001
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QUESTIONNAIRE
World Investment Report 2001:
Promoting Linkages
Sales No. E.01.II.D.12
In order to improve the quality and relevance of the work of the UNCTAD Division on
Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development, it would be useful to receive the views of
readers on this and other similar publications. It would therefore be greatly appreciated if you could
complete the following questionnaire and return to:
Readership Survey
UNCTAD Division on Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development
United Nations Office in Geneva
Palais des Nations
Room E-10054
CH-1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland
1.

Name and address of respondent (optional):
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

2.

Which of the following best describes your area of work?
Government

Public enterprise

Private enterprise institution

Academic or research

International organization

Media

Not-for-profit organization

Other (specify)

3.

In which country do you work?

4.

What is your assessment of the contents of this publication?

5.

Excellent

Adequate

Good

Poor

How useful is this publication to your work?
Very useful

Of s o m e u s e

Irrelevant
6.

Please indicate the three things you liked best about this publication:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________

7.

Please indicate the three things you liked least about this publication:
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________
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8.

9.

If you have read more than the present publication of the UNCTAD Division on Investment,
Enterprise Development and Technology, what is your overall assessment of them?
Consistently good

Usually good,
but with some exceptions

Generally mediocre

Poor

On the average, how useful are these publications to you in your work?
Very useful

Of some use

Irrelevant

10. Are you a regular recipient of Transnational Corporations (formerly The CTC Reporter), the
Division’s tri-annual refereed journal?
Yes

No

If not, please check here if you would like to receive a sample
copy sent to the name and address you have given above
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Appendix V
Capstone Prospectus

–

2/15/2002

Name: Karen Monica Patty
Capstone Advisor: Paul Mason Fotsch
Section 1:
Working Title of Capstone: Ethics for the New World Order
Capstone Topic: The New World Order is coming about through increased
cooperation between countries throughout the world to consolidate ideas in
technology, automation, communication, finance, and politics. This New World
Order is creating a job market that is as colorful as it is progressive. Due to this
increasingly multicultural job market and recent events involving foreign nationals
attacking the United States, today American college graduates are more in need
of interracial and intercultural skills in order to be successful, personally as well
as professionally. A comprehensive study of ethics can be crucial in gaining the
skills necessary to engage others on their own terms and to make effective
strides towards solutions that account for everyone’s best interest.
For generations in America we have labeled people: the “Hippie
Generation”, the “Me Generation”, “Generation X”. It is the same mentality that
we as a nation use to name other countries or people that strips that particular
group of its complexity and, consequently, its beauty. In this New World Order,
with increasing contact with other races and cultures, this categorization of
people into nameless, faceless groups is going to faze out very quickly because
of it’s inherent racist and ethnocentric tones. What is to replace it must be more
cooperative and compassionate. We, America’s graduates, are on the threshold
of a new world, where ethics will be vital in naming our experience, if indeed it
needs to be named. But we can’t do it if we don’t have the tools, the terminology,
the motivation, and the will.
Section 2:
MLOs and Criteria:
- MLO 2: Research Skills: Acquiring, evaluating, interpreting, applying,
documenting, and presenting knowledge gained through an appropriate
method of
inquiry in the context of an analysis of an issue, question or problem. This
MLO will aid me in giving a brief overview of ethics while attempting to
relate it to our
changing world in a way that will show its value as a skill necessary for
success. Sources will include recent ethics classes as well as an historical
synopsis of ethics, where it came from and how it has evolved to give a

63

-

background from which to launch my primary discussion of the practicality
of ethics as a skill for success in the workplace.
MLO 3: Relational Communication Skills: Ability to interact ethically and
effectively in interpersonal and group communication and decision-making
process. I plan to use the events of September 11, and our increasingly
multicultural world to illustrate the need for ethics as we, college
graduates, enter the world market. Relational ethics will be the primary
focus of my research in trying to design a practical guide to successful
relationships and ethical decision-making for American college graduates
to use upon entry into the new, multicultural workforce.
- MLO 5: Critical Cultural Analysis: Investigating and explaining
relationships among cultural ideologies and socio-historical experiences,
interests, identities, and actions of specific cultural groups. I will examine
the world market, in the wake of September 11, and explore how ethics
could help us cope with events such as terrorism, when so many different
nations and creeds work alongside us every day, and to help us work
through cultural, racial, and ideological differences to understand another
on his own terms and reach a plane of cooperation without imposing our
American cultural identity as a norm.

Section 3:
Research Questions:
- What is ethics?
- How does it differ from morality?
- Is ethics transnational/trans-cultural?
- What is the New World Order?
- Why should ethics matter in the New World Order?
- How does the New World Order affect American graduates?
- How will/have the events of September 11 change/d the dynamics of
our entry, as American graduates, into the global workforce?
- Can a study of ethics aid our success in this new world?
- What would an ethical guide to success look like?
Section 4: Preliminary Bibliography
Adler, Mortimer J., The time of our lives : the ethics of common sense. Bronx, N.Y.:
Fordham University Press, 1996.
Almond, Brenda., Exploring ethics : a traveller's tale. Oxford; Malden, Mass.: Blackwell
Publishers, 1998.
Boss, Judith A., Ethics for life : an interdisciplinary and multicultural introduction.
Mountain View, Calif.: Mayfield Pub., c1998.
Brown, Marvin T., Working ethics : strategies for decision making and organizational
responsibility. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1990.
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Brown, Montague., The quest for moral foundations : an introduction to ethics.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1996.
Hill, Jason D., Becoming a cosmopolitan : what it means to be a human being in the
New millennium Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, c2000.
His Holiness The Dalai Lama., Ethics for the new millennium. New York: Riverhead
Books, 1999.
Hopkins, Willie E., Ethical dimensions of diversity. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage
Publications, 1997.
Küng, Hans and Helmut Schmidt ed., A global ethic and global responsibilities: two
declarations. World's Parliament of Religions (1993: Chicago, Ill.) London:
SCM, 1998.
Küng, Hans. A global ethic for global politics and economics. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
Manley II, Walter W. with William A. Shrode., Critical issues in business conduct : legal,
ethical, and social challenges for the 1990s. New York: Quorum Books, 1990.
Miller, Richard W. Moral differences : truth, justice, and conscience in a world of
conflict. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1992.
Moon, J. Donald., Constructing community : moral pluralism and tragic conflicts.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, c1993.
Sims, Ronald R., Ethics and organizational decision making : a call for renewal.
Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1994.
Tiles. J.E. Moral measures : an introduction to ethics, West and East. London; New
York: Routledge, 2000.
Weston, Anthony., A practical companion to ethics. New York: Oxford University Press,
1997.

Section 5:
Research plan not finalized as of this date – meeting with librarian next week.
Section 6:
I plan to present a research paper outlining the need for and benefits of an
introduction to ethics class as a part of a general undergraduate degree program as well
as outlining the basics necessary to draft and implement a practical guide to ethics in
the multicultural workplace.
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